On Semantic Generalizations of the Bernays-Sch\"onfinkel-Ramsey Class
  with Finite or Co-finite Spectra by Sankaran, Abhisekh & Chakraborty, Supratik
ar
X
iv
:1
00
2.
43
34
v2
  [
cs
.L
O]
  4
 M
ar 
20
10
On Semantic Generalizations of the Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey Class with
Finite or Co-finite Spectra
Abhisekh Sankaran and Supratik Chakraborty
Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Bombay, India
{abhisekh, supratik}@cse.iitb.ac.in
Abstract
Motivated by model-theoretic properties of the Bernays-
Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey (BSR) class, we present a family of
semantic classes of FO formulae with finite or co-finite
spectra over a relational vocabulary Σ. A class in this
family is denoted EBSΣ(σ), where σ ⊆ Σ. Formulae
in EBSΣ(σ) are preserved under substructures modulo a
bounded core and modulo re-interpretation of predicates in
Σ \ σ. We study several properties of the family EBSΣ =
{EBSΣ(σ) | σ ⊆ Σ}. For example, classes in EBSΣ are
spectrally indistinguishable, the smallest class, EBSΣ(Σ),
is semantically equivalent to BSR over Σ, and the largest
class, EBSΣ(∅), is the set of all FO formulae over Σ with
finite or co-finite spectra. Furthermore, (EBSΣ,⊆) forms a
lattice that is isomorphic to the powerset lattice (℘(Σ),⊆).
We also show that if Σ contains at least one predicate of
arity ≥ 2, there exist semantic gaps between EBSΣ(σ1)
and EBSΣ(σ2) if σ1 6= σ2. This gives a natural seman-
tic generalization of BSR as ascending chains in the lattice
(EBSΣ,⊆).
We study the semantic relationship of the EBSΣ(σ) classes
with other fragments of FO, and observe that many well-
known classes are semantically subsumed by EBSΣ(Σ) or
EBSΣ(∅). This study also provides alternative proofs of
some interesting results like the Los´-Tarski Theorem and the
semantic subsumption of the Lo¨wenheim class with equality
by BSR.
We show that the membership problem for each class in
EBSΣ is undecidable. As a step towards syntactically char-
acterizing fragments of EBSΣ(σ), we present a syntac-
tic sub-class of EBSΣ(σ) called EDPΣ(σ) and give an
expression for the size of the bounded cores of models of
EDPΣ(σ) formulae. Using this, we characterize the com-
plexity of the satisfiability problem for EDPΣ(σ). We show
that the EDPΣ(σ) classes also form a lattice structure. Fi-
nally, we study some closure properties and applications of
the classes presented.
1 Introduction and Preliminaries
The Bernays-Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey class (henceforth called
BSR) is a widely used decidable class of first order logic
sentences [1]. Several recent works have addressed the
problem of efficiently checking satisfiability of BSR for-
mulae in practice [3]. Motivated by the increasing interest
in BSR formulae in recent times, we consider the problem
of generalizing this class both in a semantic and syntactic
sense, while retaining decidability of satisfiability checking.
In doing so, we would like to exploit advances in decision
procedures for BSR to answer corresponding questions for
formulae in these more general classes
Preliminaries: We represent a tuple of variables
(x1, x2, . . . xn) using the shorthand x. A first order logic
(henceforth called FO) formula ϕ(x1, x2, . . . xn) with free
variables x1, x2, . . . xn is represented as ϕ(x) for nota-
tional convenience. A sentence is a formula without any
free variables. The signature or vocabulary of a formula is
the set of all function and predicate symbols that appear in
the formula. It is well known that functions are “syntactic
sugar” in first-order logic. Specifically, for every formula ϕ
with a k-ary function f , there is an equisatisfiable formula
ψ with a (k + 1)-ary predicate Pf , such that the models of
ϕ are in one-to-one correspondence with the models of ψ.
Hence, for the remainder of our discussion, we will assume
without loss of generality that the vocabulary is relational,
i.e. has only predicate symbols. The set of all FO sentences
over the vocabulary Σ with equality as a special interpret-
ted predicate (the interpretation always being the identity
relation) is denoted FOΣ. When we talk about FO over
the vocabulary Σ without equality as a special interpretted
predicate, we will explicitly refer it to it as ‘FOΣ without
equality’. The set of all BSR sentences over Σ is denoted
BSRΣ. A formula ϕ(x1, x2, . . . xn) is said to be in prenex
conjunctive normal form (PCNF) if it has the syntactic
form Q1y1Q2y2 . . . Qkyk φ(y1, y2, . . . yk, x1, x2, . . . xn),
where eachQi ∈ {∀, ∃} and φ(y1, y2, . . . yk, x1, x2, . . . xn)
is a conjunction of clauses, with each clause being a disjunc-
tion of literals, and each literal being either an instance of
2a predicate or its negation. It is well known that every FO
formula is semantically equivalent to one in PCNF. Hence,
we will focus our attention only on PCNF formulas. Since
the satisfiability question for a FO formula can be reduced
to the satisfiability of a correspondingFO sentence, we will
focus only on FO sentences in the sequel.
Given a relational vocabulary Σ, a Σ-structure M consists
of a universe (or domain) of elements UM , and an interpre-
tation PM of every predicate P ∈ Σ. The interpretation
of a k-ary predicate over UM is a subset of (UM )k, giving
all the tuples in (UM )k for which PM evaluates to True.
Given a sentence ϕ over the vocabulary Σ, a Σ-structureM
is said to be a model of ϕ, denoted M |= ϕ, if ϕ evaluates
to True when evaluated over M . If M is a Σ-structure, the
substructure M ′ of M generated by UM ′ ⊆ UM consists
of the universe UM ′ and the restriction of the interpretation
PM of each predicate P on UM ′ . Given two Σ-structures
M1 and M2 with the same universe, and a set of predicates
σ ⊆ Σ, we say that M1 |σ= M2 |σ if the interpretation of
all predicates in σ are the same in M1 and M2
Consider a FO sentence ϕ in PCNF. It is well known that
if the quantifier prefix of ϕ consists of only ∀ quantifiers
(such sentences are called ∀∗ sentences), then ϕ is pre-
served in substructures. In other words, if M |= ϕ and
if M ′ is a substructure of M , then M ′ |= ϕ as well. The
Los´-Tarski theorem [2] states that the converse also holds,
i.e. every FO sentence that is preserved in substructures
is semantically equivalent to a ∀∗ sentence. Generalizing
the syntactic requirements, if we allow the quantifier prefix
to be a string in ∃∗∀∗, we get a sentence in the Bernays-
Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey (BSR) class, also called the Effec-
tively Propositional (EPR) class. Let B denote the length
of the ∃∗ prefix of ϕ. It is not hard to see that ϕ is preserved
in substructures modulo a bounded ”core”. Specifically, if
M |= ϕ, then there exists a ”core” VM ⊆ UM containing at
most B elements such that every substructureM ′ of M that
contains VM is also a model of ϕ(a). The equivalent of the
Los´-Tarski theorem for BSR can also be obtained, and will
be discussed in Section 3.
It follows from the above discussion that every ∃∗∀∗ sen-
tence has either finite or co-finite spectrum. The converse,
however, is not true. Indeed, there exist FO sentences with
co-finite spectra that neither belong to BSR nor are pre-
served under substructures modulo a bounded core. For ex-
ample, consider ψ ≡ ∀x∃yP (x, y). The spectrum of ψ
is the entire set of natural numbers, and is hence co-finite.
Yet, ψ is neither in BSR, nor is it preserved in substruc-
tures modulo a bounded core. A natural question to ask,
therefore, is whether the syntactic class BSR or the se-
mantic property of ”preservation in substructures modulo
a bounded core” can be generalized in a natural way to de-
scribe the set of all FO sentences with finite or co-finite
spectra in the limit. Such a generalization can be quite use-
ful in the study and application of fragments of FO with
finite or co-finite spectra (the widely used BSR class being
just one of them). From a theoretical standpoint, this study
can facilitate a better understanding of the semantic relation
between fragments of FO with finite or co-finite spectra.
It can also provide insights into how small models of for-
mulae belonging to certain fragments can be constructed.
Since the satisfiability problem for every fragment of FO
with finite or co-finite spectra is decidable, identifying syn-
tactic fragments with such spectral properties is useful in
practical applications as well.
The primary contributions of this paper are as follows. We
present a parameterized generalization of the ”preservation
in substructures modulo a bounded core” property that gives
us progressively more expressive fragments of FO with fi-
nite or co-finite spectra, culminating in the set of all FO
sentences with finite or co-finite spectra in the limit. We
show that a large number of known decidable fragments
of FO can be located within the fragments of this gener-
alization. We also provide a parameterized syntactic gen-
eralization of BSR that gives us progressively more ex-
pressive fragments of FO starting from BSR. There has
been recent work ([8]) on extending BSR to order-sorted
logic. Our syntactic generalization is an unsorted logic and
is orthogonal to the work in [8]. We study the relation
between this syntactic generalisation and the parametrized
semantic generalisation mentioned above. We show that the
syntactic generalization enjoys special spectral properties
that lends itself to interesting applications like SMT solving
and bounded model checking where BSR has been hitherto
used.
2 The EBSΣ(σ) class
Definition 1 (The EBSΣ(σ) class) Let ϕ be an FOΣ sen-
tence. Then ϕ is said to have the Extensible Bounded Sub-
Model property preserving σ ⊆ Σ if the following holds:
There exists a least finite cardinal B (called the bound for
ϕ - dependent on ϕ and σ in general) such that for every
Σ−structureM , ifM |= ϕ, then there exists a sub-structure
M1 of M such that
1. |UM1 | ≤ B
2. For every extensionM2 of M1 withinM , there exists a
Σ−structure M ′2 such that UM2 = UM ′2 , M
′
2 |= ϕ and
M ′2|σ =M2|σ .
The set of all FOΣ sentences having the extensible bounded
sub-model property preserving σ is called the EBSΣ(σ)
class.
We will encounter examples of formulae in the above fam-
ily of classes in the forthcoming sections. We organize our
3study of EBSΣ(σ) into three parts in the sequel: (a) The
case when σ = Σ (b) The case when σ is not necessarily
restricted to Σ (c) The case when σ = ∅.
3 EBSΣ(Σ) as a semantic characterization of
BSRΣ
Theorem 1 A sentence φ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ) iff there exists a
sentence ψ ∈ BSRΣ equivalent to φ.
Proof :
Given a BSRΣ sentence ψ, from the proof of the small
model property of BSRΣ as given in [2], it can be seen
that ψ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ) with bound B being atmost the number
of existential quantifiers of ψ. Then since EBSΣ(Σ)is a
semantic clss, if ψ is equivalent to φ, then φ also belongs to
EBSΣ(Σ).
Consider φ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ) in PCNF. W.l.o.g. let
φ = ∀z0∃v1∀z1∃v2∀z2 . . . ∃vr∀zrξ(z, v1 . . . , vr)
where z = (z0, . . . , zr) and ξ is quantifier-free. Let
Sz be the set of variables of z. Introduce fresh vari-
ables x1, . . . , xB where B is the bound for φ and let
V = {x1, . . . , xB} ∪ Sz. Consider ψ as below.
ψ = ∃x1 . . . ∃xB∀z0∀z1 . . . ∀zr (χ) where
χ = (
∨
u1∈V
. . .
∨
ur∈V
ξ(z, v1 7→ u1, . . . , vr 7→ ur))
Here ξ(z, v1 7→ u1, . . . , vr 7→ ur) is the formula obtained
by replacing every occurence of vi in ξ by ui.
If M |= φ and |UM | ≤ B, then assign values to x1 . . . xB
such that each a ∈ UM is assigned to some xi. Con-
sider an instantiation Z of z from UM . Since M |= φ,
there exist values d1, . . . , dr for v1, . . . , vr such that M |=
ξ(Z, d1, . . . , dr). Each di is the value assigned to some
ui ∈ {x1, . . . , xB}. Then M |= ξ(Z, v1 7→ u1, . . . , vr 7→
ur) and so M |= χ. Since Z was arbitrary,M |= ψ.
If M |= φ and |UM | ≥ B, then there exists M1 ⊆ M
satisfying the EBSΣ(Σ) conditions. Assign values to
x1 . . . xB s.t. each xi is assigned some a ∈ UM1 and each
a ∈ UM1 is assigned to some xj . Consider an instantiation
Z of z. Let the set of elements of Z be T . Then consider
the substructure M2 of M generated by UM1 ∪ T . Since
M1 ⊆ M2 ⊆ M , M2 |= φ. Then there exist values
d1, . . . , dr for v1, . . . , vr such that M2 |= ξ(Z, d1, . . . , dr).
Observe that since M2 ⊆ M , M |= ξ(Z, d1, . . . , dr).
Now since di ∈ UM1 ∪ T , it is the value assigned
to some ui ∈ V . Then since M |= ξ(Z, d1, . . . , dr),
M |= ξ(Z, v1 7→ u1, . . . , vr 7→ ur) and so M |= χ. Since
Z was arbitrary,M |= ψ.
Now suppose M |= ψ. Then there exists a set of values
S ⊆ UM such that the xi’s in ψ get their values from this
set and for all instantiations from UM of z, M |= χ. Then
consider the instantiationZ of z. SinceM |= χ forZ , there
exists some disjunct ξ(Z, v1 7→ u1; . . . ; vr 7→ ur) which is
True in M . Now ui ∈ V and hence is either some xj or
a universal variable z. Then if ui is xj , let di be the value
(from S) assigned to xj . If ui is the variable z, let di be
the value assigned to z in Z . Then M |= ξ(Z, d1 . . . , dr).
Then for the instantiation Z , choosing vi = di, we see that
the matrix of φ becomes True in M . Doing likewise for all
instantiations of z, we conclude that M |= φ.
From the above then, M |= φ ↔ M |= ψ i.e. φ is
equivalent to ψ, the latter being a sentence in BSRΣ.
Some consequences of Theorem 1
1. Los´-Tarski Theorem as a special case: Consider the
class of FOΣ sentences φ which are preserved under
substructures. Then we can see that φ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ)
with B = 0. Then from the proof of the Theorem 1,
we can see that φ is equivalent to a BSRΣ sentence
ψ where the number of existential quantifiers is 0. In
other words φ is equivalent to a ∀∗ sentence. The con-
verse, namely, that a ∀∗ sentence is closed under sub-
structures is well-known. We thus get the Los´-Tarski
Theorem as a special case of Theorem 1. The proof
of Theorem 1 serves as an alternate proof of the Los´-
Tarski Theorem.
The EBSΣ(Σ) property can be viewed as preserva-
tion under substructures modulo a bounded ‘core’ i.e.
all substructures of a model which contain the core of
the model are also models. The ∃∗ quantifiers in the
equivalent BSRΣ formula of an EBSΣ(Σ) formula
can be seen to assert the existence of a bounded exten-
sible core.
2. BSRΣ semantically subsumes other classes: Theo-
rem 1 helps to show right away that some classes of
FOΣ formulae are semantically contained in BSRΣ.
The Lo¨wenheim class is the class of all FOΣ sen-
tences over Σ, without equality where Σ contains only
unary predicates. The Lo¨wenheim class with equality
- denoted LΣ - is the class of all FOΣ sentences over
Σ, possibly containing equality where Σ contains only
unary predicates (Whenever we will talk about just the
Lo¨wnheim class, we will refer to it as ‘LΣ without
equality’). By an Ehrenfeucht-Fraı¨sse´ game argument
(see [2], pp. 259), one can show that if φ ∈ LΣ, then
φ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ) with the bound B = q · 2m where q
is the length of the quantifier prefix of φ and m is the
number of unary predicates (m = |Σ|). By theorem 1,
we immediately know that for φ, there is an equivalent
BSRΣ sentence ψ whose number of existential quan-
tifiers is B. Since Σ contains only unary predicates,
this shows us that LΣ is semantically the same as the
4BSRΣ class, the latter being a proper syntactic subset
of the former.
Other known classes which can be seen to be sub-
sumed semantically by BSRΣ include FOΣ[1] and
FOΣ[1] with counting which are respectively the class
of FOΣ sentences having only one variable and the
class of FOΣ sentences with counting having only one
variable. These are contained inside LΣ and hence are
semantically within BSRΣ.
3. Translation from EBSΣ(Σ) to BSRΣ: The proof not
only shows us that for a sentence φ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ), there
exists an equivalent BSRΣ sentence, but also gives us
the sentence (ψ in the proof). It gives a uniform trans-
lation scheme from the whole of EBSΣ(Σ) to BSRΣ.
As for the size of ψ, the number of ∃ variables is B, the
number of ∀ variables is atmost k + 1 where k is the
number of ∀ variables in φ and the size of the matrix is
O((B + k + 1)r · |ξ|) where |ξ| is the length of ξ and
where r (number of existential quantifiers) and ξ are as
in the proof.
4. Optimal translation: The proof also shows us that for
a sentence φ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ) whose bound is B, there
cannot exist an equivalent BSRΣ sentence with B′ ∃
quantifiers where B′ < B. Otherwise, we would vio-
late the minimality of B.
5. Finding the boundB: EBSΣ(Σ) is exactly the class of
all those sentences which are equivalent to formulae in
BSRΣ. This syntactic characterization of EBSΣ(Σ)
as BSRΣ, the latter being a syntactic class for which
membership is decidable, shows us that the member-
ship problem for EBSΣ(Σ) is recursively enumer-
able (We show later that the membership problem for
EBSΣ(Σ) is undecidable though in general). Sup-
pose we knew that φ belongs to EBSΣ(Σ), but did
not know the bound B for φ. A naive approach would
be to try to prove equivalence of φ with each BSRΣ
formula with k ∃ quantifiers, for increasing values of
k. The above proof however shows that for each k, it
is sufficient to construct exactly one BSRΣ formula
with which the equivalence of φ needs to be checked.
Following is the procedure of finding B in detail:
For each B ≥ 0, we construct the formula ψ as shown
in the proof. Call this formula ψB . We then construct
the formula ΞB = (φ ↔ ψB). We then interleave
the procedures which check for the validity of ΞB’s for
B ≥ 0. If φ indeed belongs to EBSΣ(Σ), then one
of these procedures is guaranteed to terminate. The
least B for which ΞB is valid gives the bound B for φ
(since, if the bound for φ was lower, say B′, then from
the above proof, we know that ΞB′ would have been
valid thus violating the minimality of B). It also gives
an equivalent formula for φ, namely ψB , with the least
number of ∃∗ quantifiers. This procedure thus requires
us to construct exactly one BSRΣ formula having B ∃
quantifiers for each B in order to find an equivalent
BSRΣ formula for φ. It just means that BSRΣ for-
mulae other than the ψBs need not be enumerated at
all.
6. Uses in SAT and model checking:An advantage of
converting an EBSΣ(Σ) formula φ to its equivalent
BSRΣ formula ψ is that φ is satisfiable iff ψ is satisfi-
able. There has been a lot of recent work [3] on deci-
sion procedures for the EPR class - which is the same
as BSR. While the fact that φ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ) shows
that the SAT-problem for EBSΣ(Σ) is decidable and
the bound B for φ gives a way of checking the satisfia-
bility of φ, we can leverage recent advances in decision
procedures for BSR to check for satisfiability of φ.
Likewise the model checking problem for φ (given a
Σ−structure M , is it true that M |= φ) would be the
same as that forψ. Hence the power of model checkers
optimized for BSR could be leveraged.
4 Properties of the EBSΣ(σ) classes
The EBSΣ(Σ) property required that any model M of a
formula φ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ) is such that φ is also True in any
substructure of M which contains the ‘bounded core’ of
M . While EBSΣ(Σ) required the preservation of the in-
terpretation of all the predicates of Σ, EBSΣ(σ) relaxes
this requirement. It insists that the interpretation of only the
predicates of a specified subset σ of Σ be preserved. The
Σ \ σ predicates are free to be re-interpreted in any way by
which φ becomes True in the resulting structure. Specifi-
cally, condition 2 in Definition 1 in section 2 does not re-
quire the extension M2 to satisfy ϕ. Instead, it requires the
existence of a modelM ′2 which possibly differs fromM2 in
the interpretation of predicates in Σ \ σ.
As an example, consider ϕ = ∀x∃yP (x, y). Here Σ =
{P}. If we consider σ = ∅, then by choosing B = 1, for
any model M of size ≥ B, take M1 to be the substructure
generated by any one element ofM . Then for any extension
M2 of M1 within M , construct M ′2 by re-interpreting P
to be the identity relation. Clearly then M ′2 |= ϕ. Thus
ϕ ∈ EBSΣ(∅).
If however σ = Σ, then consider the model M in which
UM = N and P (i, j) = True iff j = i + 1. Suppose
ϕ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ). Then there exists a sub-structureM1 of M
of some bounded size say B such that M1 |= ϕ. Consider
the highest number i∗ in UM1 . Then there exists j∗ ∈ UM1
such that P (i∗, j∗) is True in M1. But since M1 ⊆ M ,
j∗ = i∗ + 1. This contradicts the assumption that i∗ is the
5highest number in UM1 . This shows that ϕ /∈ EBSΣ(Σ).
Let us define the family EBSΣ = {EBSΣ(σ)|σ ⊆ Σ}.
In the section below, we look into set inclusions between
the different classes in EBSΣ, and show that the poset
(EBSΣ,⊆) has a lattice structure to it.
4.1 Lattice Structure of (EBSΣ,⊆)
Theorem 2 1. If σ1 ⊆ σ2 ⊆ Σ, then EBSΣ(σ2) ⊆
EBSΣ(σ1).
2. If Σ contains an arity ≥ 2 predicate, then given
σ1, σ2 ∈ Σ, if σ1 \ σ2 is non-empty, then EBSΣ(σ2) \
EBSΣ(σ1) is also non-empty.
3. If Σ contains only unary predicates, then
EBSΣ(σ1) = EBSΣ(σ2) for any σ1, σ2 ⊆ Σ.
Proof:
Statement (1) above is easy to see. Consider φ ∈
EBSΣ(σ2). Then φ satisfies condition 2 of Definition 1
for σ = σ2. Since σ1 ⊆ σ2, M ′2|σ2 = M2|σ2 im-
plies that M ′2|σ1 = M2|σ1 . Then φ satisfies the condi-
tion 2 for σ = σ1 as well. The first condition of Defini-
tion 1 is independent of σ. Then φ ∈ EBSΣ(σ1). Then
EBSΣ(σ2) ⊆ EBSΣ(σ1).
We now prove statement (2) above. We consider the follow-
ing cases.
1) σ1 \ σ2 contains an arity ≥ 2 predicate. Let P be such a
predicate of arity k ≥ 2.
We use the same idea as in the example above to construct
a formula φ ∈ EBSΣ(σ2) \ EBSΣ(σ1). Construct φ as
follows.
φ = (
∧
Q∈Σ\{P}
∀zQQ(zQ)) ∧ (∀x∃yP (x, y, y, . . . , y))
where zQ is a vector of variables where the length of the
vector is equal to the arity of Q. Call the first and second
conjuncts in the above formula as α and β respectively. We
first show that φ ∈ EBSΣ(σ2). Consider a model M of φ
of size ≥ 1. Consider any element a ∈ UM and let M1 be
the substructure of M generated by {a}. Consider any M2
such that M1 ⊆M2 ⊆M . ConsiderM ′2 obtained fromM2
in which the interpretation of all the Σ \ {P} predicates are
retained as in M2 (this will mean that the interpretation of
the predicates of σ2 will also be preserved). But for P , since
P /∈ σ2, re-interpret P to be ‘fully’ True, i.e. in M ′2, P is
True for all values of its arguments. Now since α is a ∀∗
formula over the vocabulary Σ \ {P}, it is True in all sub-
structures ofM |Σ\{P}. Then since M ′2|Σ\{P} ⊆M |Σ\{P},
M ′2|Σ\{P} |= α and hence M ′2 |= α. Further since P is
fully True in M ′2, M ′2 |= β. Thus M ′2 |= φ. This shows
φ ∈ EBSΣ(σ2) with B = 1.
We now show that φ /∈ EBSΣ(σ1). Consider the model M
in which UM = N. Let all the predicates in Σ \ {P} be
fully True in M . Let P (x, y1, . . . , yk−1) = True iff y1 =
y2 = · · · = yk−1 = y and y = x + 1. Consider any
sub-structure M1 of M of size ≤ B for some B. Let
M2 = M1 and consider any sub-structure M ′2 obtained
from M2 by possibly re-interpreting the predicates of
Σ \ σ1 but keeping the interpretations of the σ1 predicates
the same. If M ′2 |= φ, then M ′2 |= β. Let i∗ be the highest
number in UM ′
2
= UM2 . Since M ′2 |= β, there exists
j∗ ∈ UM2 such that M ′2 |= P (i∗, j∗, . . . , j∗). But since
P ∈ σ1, M ′2|{P} =M |{P} and hence j∗ = i∗+1. But that
contradicts the assumption that i∗ is the highest number in
UM2 . This shows that φ /∈ EBSΣ(σ1).
2) σ1\σ2 contains only unary predicates. Then P /∈ σ1\σ2.
Let U ∈ σ1 \ σ2. In order to save space, below P(x, y) is a
shorthand for P (x, y, . . . , y).
Construct φ as follows.
α1 = ∀x∀y1 . . .∀yk−1(P (x, y1, . . . , yk−1)→
((y1 = y2) ∧ . . . ∧ (yk−2 = yk−1)))
α2 = ∀x∀y((x = y) ∨ (P(x, y)⊕ P(y, x))) ∧
∀x∀y∀z(P(x, y) ∧ P(y, z))→ P(x, z)
β = (
∧
Q∈Σ\{P,U} ∀zQQ(zQ))
succ(x, y) = (x 6= y) ∧ P(x, y)∧
∀z((z 6= x ∧ z 6= y ∧ P(x, z))→ P(y, z))
γ = ∀x∀y(succ(x, y)→ (U(x)↔ ¬U(y)))
φ = α1 ∧ α2 ∧ β ∧ γ
Above⊕ means XOR. The condition α1 ∧ α2 states that P
is essentially a linear order. γ states that the elements of the
linear order are alternately labelled with U and ¬U .
We first show that φ ∈ EBSΣ(σ2). Consider any model
M of φ of size ≥ 1. Let a ∈ UM . Then consider the
substructure M1 generated by {a}. Consider M2 such that
M1 ⊆M2 ⊆M . Consider M ′2 obtained from M2 by inter-
preting all the predicates of Σ \ {U} as in M2 but in which
U is interpreted such that the elements of the linear order
defined by P in M ′2 are alternately labelled with U and ¬U
(the linear order amongst the elements of UM ′
2
is the same
in M ′2 as the linear order amongst them in M ). Clearly
then M ′2 |= γ. Now since α1 ∧ α2 ∧ β is a ∀∗ sentence
over Σ \ {U} and since M ′2|Σ\{U} ⊆ M |Σ\{U}, we have
M ′2|Σ\{U} |= (α1∧α2∧β) and henceM ′2 |= (α1∧α2∧β).
Thus M ′2 |= φ. This shows that φ ∈ EBSΣ(σ2) with
B = 1.
We now show that φ /∈ EBSΣ(σ1). Consider a model M
of φ in which UM = N, all predicates in Σ \ {P,U} are
fully True, P is essentially the usual ’<’ linear order and
the elements of UM are alternately labelled with U and ¬U .
Now consider any sub-structure M1 of M of size ≤ B for
some B. Let the number of ‘¬U ’ elements in UM1 be m.
Then consider any subset U∗ ⊆ UM such that (i) UM1 (
U∗ and U∗ \ UM1 contains only those elements from UM
6which are labelled with a ‘U ’ in M and (ii) if the number
of ‘U ’ elements of M in U∗ is n, then n − m ≥ 2. Let
M2 be the substructure of M generated by U∗. Then M1 ⊆
M2 ⊆ M . Now consider any sub-structure M ′2 obtained
from M2 by possibly re-interpreting the predicates of Σ \
σ1 but keeping the interpretations of the σ1 predicates the
same. IfM ′2 |= φ, thenM ′2 |= (α1∧α2∧γ). Then P would
impose a linear order on the elements of UM ′
2
(This linear
order would be the same as that imposed on UM ′
2
by the
interpretation of P in M if P ∈ σ1 and could be different
from that imposed on UM ′
2
by the interpretation of P in M
if P /∈ σ1. But in either case, it would be a linear order).
Now since U ∈ σ1, the interpretation of U is the same in
M and M ′2 and hence the number of elements labelled by
U and ¬U in M ′2 are n and m respectively. Since M ′2 |=
γ, the elements of UM ′
2
are alternately labelled by U and
¬U so that |n −m| ≤ 1. But this contradicts the fact that
n−m ≥ 2. This shows that φ /∈ EBSΣ(σ1).
Thus in all cases we have shown that EBSΣ(σ2) \
EBSΣ(σ1) is non-empty.
The proof of statement 3 of theorem 2 is easy to see. If Σ
contains only unary predicates, then FOΣ = LΣ. Then
as seen from the consequences of Theorem 1 in section
3, FOΣ ⊆ EBSΣ(Σ). Then for any σ ⊆ Σ, since
EBSΣ(σ) ⊆ FOΣ, we have EBSΣ(σ) ⊆ EBSΣ(Σ).
But from statement 1 of theorem 2, we have EBSΣ(Σ) ⊆
EBSΣ(σ). Thus EBSΣ(σ) = EBSΣ(Σ) for any σ ⊆ Σ.
Corollary 1 If Σ contains a predicate of arity ≥ 2, then
(EBSΣ,⊆) is a complete distributive lattice which is iso-
morphic to the powerset lattice (℘(Σ),⊆). If Σ contains
only unary predicates, then (EBSΣ,⊆) collapses to the sin-
gleton lattice.
Proof:
Suppose Σ contains an arity ≥ 2 predicate. Consider
(EBSΣ,⊆). Now if σ1 6= σ2, then from statement 2 of The-
orem 2, EBSΣ(σ1) 6= EBSΣ(σ2). Then we can define the
function f : EBSΣ → ℘(Σ) given by f(EBSΣ(σ)) = Σ \
σ. If f(EBSΣ(σ1)) = f(EBSΣ(σ2)) then Σ\σ1 = Σ\σ2
or σ1 = σ2 and hence EBSΣ(σ1) = EBSΣ(σ2). Thus f
is injective. For every σ ∈ ℘(Σ), f(EBSΣ(Σ \ σ)) = σ.
Thus f is surjective and hence bijective.
Suppose EBSΣ(σ1) ⊆ EBSΣ(σ2). Then if σ2 \ σ1 6=
{}, then from statement 2 of Theorem 2, EBSΣ(σ1) \
EBSΣ(σ2) 6= {} violating the assumption just made. Then
σ2 ⊆ σ1 or Σ \ σ1 ⊆ Σ \ σ2 or f(EBSΣ(σ1)) ⊆
f(EBSΣ(σ2)).
Suppose f(EBSΣ(σ1)) ⊆ f(EBSΣ(σ2)). Then Σ \ σ1 ⊆
Σ \ σ2 or σ2 ⊆ σ1. Then from statement 1 of Theorem 2,
EBSΣ(σ1) ⊆ EBSΣ(σ2).
Thus EBSΣ(σ1) ⊆ EBSΣ(σ2) iff f(EBSΣ(σ1)) ⊆
f(EBSΣ(σ2)). Thus f is an isomorphism between
(EBSΣ,⊆) and the powerset lattice (℘(Σ),⊆).
Suppose Σ contains only unary predicates. Then from
Theorem 2 (3), we see that EBSΣ contains only one
element, namely EBSΣ(Σ).
The lub(⊔) and glb(⊓) operators in (EBSΣ,⊆) are de-
fined as: EBSΣ(σ1) ⊔ EBSΣ(σ2) = EBSΣ(σ1 ∩ σ2)
and EBSΣ(σ1) ⊓ EBSΣ(σ2) = EBSΣ(σ1 ∪ σ2). Note
that EBSΣ(σ1 ∪ σ2) ⊆ (EBSΣ(σ1) ∩ EBSΣ(σ2)) and
(EBSΣ(σ1) ∪EBSΣ(σ2)) ⊆ EBSΣ(σ1 ∩ σ2).
4.2 EBSΣ(σ) and other semantic classes
Let FMPΣ be the set of all FOΣ sentences φ such that if
φ has a model, it also has a finite model. Let FSMPΣ be
the set of all FOΣ sentences φ such that for every model of
φ, there is a finite sub-model of it. One can then show the
following relations of these with EBSΣ(σ).
Lemma 1 1. If Σ contains only unary predicates, then
FOΣ = FMPΣ = FSMPΣ = EBSΣ(σ) for all
σ ⊆ Σ.
2. If Σ contains an arity ≥ 2 predicate, then ∀ σ ⊆ Σ,
(a) EBSΣ(σ) ( FMPΣ
(b) (i) EBSΣ(Σ) ( FSMPΣ (ii) EBSΣ(σ) \
FSMPΣ and FSMPΣ \ EBSΣ(σ) are both
non-empty for σ 6= Σ.
Proof :
Consider Statement 1 above. If Σ contains only unary pred-
icates, then FOΣ = LΣ (the Lo¨wenheim class with equal-
ity). Then as seen in section 3, FOΣ ⊆ EBSΣ(Σ). From
Theorem 2(3), for all σ ⊆ Σ, EBSΣ(Σ) = EBSΣ(σ) ⊆
FOΣ. Then every FOΣ formula has the finite model, finite
sub-model and the EBSΣ(σ) properties for each σ ⊆ Σ.
Consider the case when Σ contains a predicate P of arity
≥ 2. Every EBSΣ(σ) sentence is either unsatisfiable or
has a finite model (of size B where B is the bound for φ)
and hence has the finite model property. Thus for all σ ⊆ Σ,
EBSΣ(σ) ⊆ FMPΣ. But the converse is not true. Con-
sider the sentence φ as below.
φ = α1 ∧ α2∧
∀x∀y(succ(x, y)→ (P(x, x)↔ ¬P(y, y))∧
∃x∃y(first(x) ∧ P(x, x) ∧ last(y) ∧ ¬P(y, y))
where α1, α2 and succ(x, y) are as in the proof of case (2)
of statement 2 of Theorem 2. first(x) and last(x) denote
that x is respectively the first and last element of the linear
order. Any finite model of φ can be seen to be ‘essentially’
a linear order with its elements alternately coloured and
not coloured (an element a is coloured iff P(a, a) is True),
where the first element is coloured and the last is not.
Then φ has finite models of only even cardinality. Thus φ
7has the finite model property. Its easy to see that φ also
has the finite sub-model property. But from Lemma 2 (in
the forthcoming section 5), φ cannot be in EBSΣ(∅) and
hence from Theorem 2(1), it cannot be in EBSΣ(σ) for
any σ ⊆ Σ. This shows statement 2a and the second part of
statement 2b(ii).
Consider statement 2b. Now by definition, all sentences in
EBSΣ(Σ) are also in FSMPΣ. Then consideringφ above,
we get statement 2b(i).
Consider EBSΣ(σ). If Σ\σ contains a predicate P of arity
≥ 2, then consider the sentence φ as given in the proof of
part (1) of statement 2 of Theorem 2. This sentence cannot
have the finite submodel property. If Σ \ σ contains only
unary predicates, then consider one such unary predicate U .
Then consider the sentence φ = φ1 ∧ φ2 where φ1 asserts
that P is essentially a linear order and φ2 asserts that either
there is no last element in the model or if there is one, then
it must be labelled with U . Then consider an infinite linear
order in which no element is labelled with U . One can see
that while this models φ, no finite sub-model of this can
model φ. But since U lies outside σ, for any finite sub-
model, one can change the interpretation of U and label the
last element of the finite sub-model with U to make φ true
in the resulting model. Hence φ ∈ EBSΣ(σ). This finally
shows the first part of 2b(ii).
5 The EBSΣ(∅) class
In this section, we study the EBSΣ(∅) class. We firstly
observe that this class subsumes some well-known syntactic
classes.
5.1 The EBSΣ(∅) class subsumes well-
known syntactic classes
We observe that for σ = ∅, the interpretations of none of the
predicates of Σ are required to be preserved. We can then
easily see that the following lemma is true. Below cardinal-
ity of a Σ−structure refers to the cardinality of its universe.
Lemma 2 A sentenceϕ ∈ EBSΣ(∅) iff either (i)ϕ is unsat
or (ii) there exists a least finite cardinal B such that ϕ has a
model of (a) every cardinality≥ B if ϕ has an infinite model
and (b) every cardinality ranging from B to the cardinality
of ϕ’s largest model if ϕ has only finite models.
Proof :
Supposeϕ ∈ EBSΣ(∅). LetB be the bound for φ. Suppose
it has an infinite model. We show that there is a model of ϕ
of every cardinality ≥ B.
Take any finite cardinal n ≥ B. Since ϕ has an infi-
nite model, by Compactness Theorem, there cannot be any
bound on the domain-size of the finite models of ϕ. Then
consider a model M of ϕ of domain-size ≥ n. Since ϕ ∈
EBSΣ(∅), there exists M1 ⊆ M satisfying the EBSΣ(∅)
conditions. Then take any M2 such that M1 ⊆ M2 ⊆ M
and s.t. |UM2 | = n. Then there exists M ′2 such that M ′2 has
the same domain as M2 andM ′2 |= ϕ. In other words, there
is a model of ϕ of size n.
Take any infinite cardinal. Since ϕ has an infinite model,
using the Upward and Downward Lo¨wenheim-Skolem the-
orems, we conclude that there is a model of ϕ of every infi-
nite cardinality.
Summing up, ϕ has models of every cardinality ≥ B.
Suppose ϕ has only finite models. Clearly then it cannot
have models of unbounded size because then by Compact-
ness Theorem, it would have an infinite model. Then there
exists a finite cardinal N such that the domain-size of ϕ′s
largest model is N . Then by a similar argument as above,
we can show that ϕ has models of all domain-sizes ranging
from B to N .
Thus the ‘only-if’ part of the Lemma holds.
We now prove the ‘if’ part. If ϕ is unsatisfiable, ϕ ∈
EBSΣ(∅) trivially. Suppose ϕ is satisfiable and has an
infinite model and there exists a smallest finite cardinal B
such that ϕ has a model of every cardinality ≥ B. Take
any model M of ϕ of domain-size ≥ B. Consider any
M1 ⊆ M such that |UM1 | = B. Consider any M2 such
that M1 ⊆ M2 ⊆ M . Now from the premise, there exists
a model M3 of ϕ of cardinality |UM2 |. Then consider the
Σ−structure M ′2 which is isomorphic to M3 and which has
universe UM2 . Since the set of models of ϕ is closed un-
der isomorphism, M ′2 |= ϕ and is the desired model. Thus
ϕ ∈ EBSΣ(∅).
If ϕ is satisfiable, has only finite models and has a model
of every cardinality ranging from B to the cardinality of ϕ’s
largest model, then by a similar argument as the one above,
we can show that ϕ ∈ EBSΣ(∅).
Thus the ’if’ part holds as well proving the lemma.
Using the above lemma, we can see that many well-known
classes of FOΣ sentences fall within EBSΣ(∅). It can be
shown that the following classes without functions but with
corresponding ‘function’ predicates (i.e. we disallow func-
tions but allow in their place predicates which represent the
functions by including function axioms to be satisfied by
the predicates) are also inside EBSΣ(∅).
1. The Lo¨b-Gurevich class - FOΣ without equality con-
taining only unary predicates and only unary functions.
2. The Gurevich class - the set of all ∃∗ FOΣ sentences
possibly containing functions too.
We prove the inclusion of the above classes in EBSΣ(∅)
below.
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Proof:
Consider the Lo¨b-Gurevich Class. This is the set of all
FOΣ sentences without equality over a vocabulary which
contains only unary predicates and only unary function
symbols.
As shown in [2](pp. 251), every sentence φ in the Lo¨b-
Gurevich class is satisfiable over the same domains as a
Lo¨wenheim sentence ψ. Then φ and ψ have the same
spectra. But we know that if signature of ψ is Σ, then
ψ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ) ⊆ EBSΣ(∅). Then using Lemma 2 and
the fact above that the spectrum of φ is the same as that of
ψ, we have that φ ∈ EBSΣ(∅).
It is easy to see that a sentence in the Lo¨b-Gurevich class,
with functions replaced by the corresponding function pred-
icates satisfying the function axioms will also be in φ ∈
EBSΣ(∅).
Lemma 4 The Gurevich Class ⊆ EBSΣ(∅)
Proof:
Consider an FO sentence φ in the Gurevich class. Let
φ = ∃∗zϕ(z) where ϕ could contain function symbols and
equality too in addition to predicates. Suppose M |= φ
such that |UM | ≥ |φ| where |φ| denotes the length of φ.
Then there exists elements a fromUM such thatM |= ϕ(a).
Consider all the terms occuring in ϕ(a). Let T be the set of
all the values that these terms evaluate to in M . Note that
|T | < |φ|. Choose an element a∗ ∈ UM \ T . Consider the
model M ′ such that UM ′ = UM and M ′|P = M |P where
P is the set of all predicate symbols of Σ. Now for a k−ary
function symbol f ∈ Σ, denote the interpretations of f in
M and M ′ as fM and fM ′ . Then fM ′ is defined as fol-
lows: Let f(t1, . . . , tk) be a term in ϕ(a). Let t1M , . . . tkM
be the evaluations of t1, . . . , tk in M (then the former are
values in T ). Then fM ′(t1M , . . . , tkM ) = fM (t1M , . . . , tkM )
(observe that this value must also be in T ). For all other val-
ues a1, . . . , ak for which there do not exist terms t1, . . . , tk
such that (i) tiM = ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and (ii) f(t1, . . . , tk) is
a term in ϕ(a), assign f(a1, . . . , ak) = a∗.
Then consider the substructureM1 ofM ′ generated by T ∪
{a∗}. One can see that by our construction above UM1 =
T ∪{a∗}. Consider the substructureM2 generated by anyU
s.t. UM1 ⊆ U ⊆ UM . Again by our construction UM2 = U .
Then for all terms t appearing in ϕ(a), tM2 = tM ′ (since
M2 ⊆ M ′) and by construction tM ′ = tM . Then in M2,
all the terms evaluate to exactly the same values as they
evaluate to in M . Now since M2|P = M ′|P = M |P (the
first equality is because M2 ⊆ M ′ and the second is by
construction),M2 |= ϕ(a) i.e. M2 |= φ.
This thus shows that given a model M of φ of size ≥ B =
|φ|, it is possible to construct a modelM ′ of φ by preserving
the interpretations of all the predicates of Σ and changing
the interpretations of only the functions such that M ′ has
the extensible bounded submodel property.
It is easy to see that Φ which is obtained by replacing the
functions in φ by their corresponding function predicates
and adding the function axioms will also satisfy the above
property.
As a corollary of this we get that if Φ has a model with
domain-size n ≥ B, it has models of all domain-sizes
ranging from B to n. Then if Φ has models of unbounded
domain-size - which is iff it has an infinite model - then
by the previous statement and the Upward and Downward
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems, it has models of all domain-
sizes ≥ B. Thus Φ ∈ EBSΣ(∅) where Σ is the vocabulary
of Φ.
We have already seen earlier that FOΣ[1] and FOΣ[1] with
counting are inside EBSΣ(Σ) and hence inside EBSΣ(∅).
We now show below that FOΣ[2] (FOΣ with only two
variables) is contained in EBSΣ(∅).
Lemma 5 FOΣ[2] ⊆ EBSΣ(∅)
Proof:
We refer to the proof of the finite model property ofFOΣ[2]
as shown in [5]. Firstly it is sufficent to consider only arity
≤ 2 predicates when dealing with FOΣ[2]. As shown in
[5], an FOΣ[2] sentence φ over Σ is equisatisifiable over
the same domains with an FOΣ[2] sentence ψ over a vo-
cabulary Σ1 which contains no arity > 2 predicates. The
paper further constructs a sentence θ over the same vocabu-
lary Σ1, in Scott Normal Form. i.e. θ is of the form
θ = ∀x∀yα(x, y) ∧
∧i=m
i=1 ∀x∃y(βi(x, y) ∧ x 6= y)
where α and the βi’s are quantifier-free. θ is such that ψ has
a model whose domain-size is n ≥ 2 iff θ has a model with
domain-size n. Then it is shown that if θ is satisfiable, it has
a model with domain-size atmost 3m.2n where n = |Σ1|.
We now show that if θ is satisfiable, either it has only
finitely many models or it has models with all domain-sizes
≥ 3m.2n. Then ψ and hence φ would have either finitely
many models or models with all domain-sizes ≥ 3m.2n.
The argument is a simple extension of the procedure (given
in [5]) used in constructing the small model for θ.
Firstly if all models of θ have domain-size ≤ 2n then all
models of ψ and hence φ would also have domain-size ≤
2n. If not then consider a model of θ of domain size >
2n. Then there exists an element in the model which is not
a ‘king’ (See [5] for the definition of ’king’). Now from
this model, construct the small model M for θ as per the
procedure. Then in M consider an element dij (using the
same notation as in the paper). We introduce a new element
d′ in M which will ‘mimic’ dij . In particular, d′ has the
same 1-type as dij . Next, for every element e inM different
from dij and d′, we make the 2-type of (d′, e) the same
as the 2-type of (dij , e). Note that this 2-type assignment
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of d′. Further this assignment of the 2-type between d′ and
e cannot conflict with the 2-types of the already existing
(i.e. prior to the introduction of d′) pairs of elements since
this 2-type is being assigned for a completely new pair of
elements. Finally assign the 2-type of (d′, dij) to be the 2-
type of any two elements of M whose 1-types are the same
as that of d′ and dij , for example say, eij and dij . Thus
there would be no conflicts at all in this new structure, call
it M+.
Now we show that M+ |= θ. While the existing ele-
ments already have ‘skolem witnesses’, it remains to choose
skolem witnesses for d′. To provide skolem witnesses for
d′, we will again just mimic what was done for dij i.e. for
each k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we will choose the same skolem wit-
ness for d′ for k as the the skolem witness gk(dij) for dij
for k. Now by construction, the 2 types of (dij , gk(dij)) and
(d′, gk(dij)) are the same. Since the 2-type of (dij , gk(dij))
ensures that βk(dij , gk(dij)) was True, βk(d′, gk(dij)) will
also be True. Then the second conjunct above of θ would
be true in M+. Since the 2-type between d′ and any el-
ement e of M is one that was already existing in M and
since the first conjunct of θ was true in M , the first conjunct
would be true in M+ as well. Then M+ |= θ. Note that
|UM+ | = |UM |+ 1.
We can now use the same procedure on M+ to get another
model of θ which contains one more element than the num-
ber of elements in M+ and so on. Thus θ has models with
all domain-sizes ≥ 3m.2n since the initial model M had
domain-size≤ 3m.2n. Then back-tracking, ψ and hence φ
has models with all domain-sizes≥ 3m.2n.
Thus φ is either unsatisfiable, or has finitely many models
(all having domain-size ≤ 2n) or has models with all
domain-sizes≥ 3m.2n. Then by Lemma 2, φ ∈ EBSΣ(∅)
with B ≤ 3m.2n.
It can also be shown easily that the class of all FOΣ sen-
tences without equality which have the finite model prop-
erty is contained inside EBSΣ(∅).
Lemma 6 FOΣ without equality and with finite model
property ⊆ EBSΣ(∅)
Proof:
It is well known that if an FOΣ without equality sentence
φ has a model of size n, then it also has a model of size
n+ 1. Then if φ has finite model property, then either φ is
unsatisfiable or there exists a least B s.t. φ has models of all
cardinalities≥ B. Then from Lemma 2, φ ∈ EBSΣ(∅).
Any EBSΣ(∅) sentence (and hence one without equality)
has the finite model property. This shows that
EBSΣ(∅) = FOΣ without equality and
with finite model property
An example of an FOΣ without equality subclass with fi-
nite model property is the Go¨del-Kalma´r-Schu¨tte class over
Σ which is the set of all ∃∗∀∀∃∗ FOΣ sentences without
equality. This class has the small model property (see [2]).
Then this class is contained inside EBSΣ(∅).
5.2 An interesting property of EBSΣ(∅)
without equality
Consider a sentence φ ∈ EBSΣ(∅) without equality. Given
a model M of φ of domain-size ≥ B where B is the bound
for φ, it is not necessary that M have a bounded core all
of whose extensions within M also satisfy φ. But interest-
ingly, we show in this section that one can always get an-
other model M ′ with the same universe as that of M such
that M ′ has a bounded core (of size ≤ B) all of whose ex-
tensions within M ′ are also models of φ.
Consider a satisfiable sentence φ ∈ EBSΣ(∅) without
equality. Then there exists a B for φ such that for all domain
sizes n ≥ B we can construct a modelM of domain-size n.
Then there exists a model Mˆ of φ of domain-size B. Then
it is possible to construct an isomorphic model M∗ whose
universe is UM∗ = {a1, . . . , aB} ⊆ UM . Then M∗ |= φ.
We will use this model to construct the desired M ′. Let
f : UM → UM∗ be any function from UM to UM∗ such that
f(ai) = ai for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,B}. For each k−ary predi-
cate P ∈ Σ, denote the interpretation of P in M ′ and M∗
as PM
′
and PM∗ respectively. Then define P in M ′ such
that M ′ |= P (b1, . . . , bk) iff M∗ |= P (f(b1), . . . , f(bk))
for b1, . . . , bk ∈ UM . Let w.l.o.g., φ be given by
φ = ∀z0∃v1∀z1∃v2∀z2 . . . ∃vr∀zrξ(z, v1 . . . , vr)
where z = (z0, . . . , zr) and ξ is quantifier-free and in CNF.
We will show that M ′ |= φ.
Consider an instantiation Z of z from UM ′ = UM .
We need to choose values d1, . . . , dr for the variables
v1, . . . vr such that M ′ |= ξ(Z, d1, . . . , dr). Let Z∗
be the vector of values obtained by subjecting Z to f
component-wise. Then Z∗ is a vector of values from
UM∗ . Now since M∗ |= φ, there exist values d∗1, . . . , d∗r
from UM∗ such that M∗ |= ξ(Z∗, d∗1, . . . , d∗r). Then
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , r} choose di = d∗i . Now
consider an instance of P in ξ(Z, d1, . . . , dr). Say it
is P (e1, . . . , ek). Then by construction above M ′ |=
P (e1, . . . , ek) iff M∗ |= P (f(e1), . . . , f(ek)). But since
Z∗ is the image of Z under f and f(di) = f(d∗i ) = d∗i , we
find that P (f(e1), . . . , f(ek)) is the corresponding instance
of P (e1, . . . , ek) in ξ(Z∗, d∗1, . . . , d∗r). Then since the latter
is True inM∗, ξ(Z, d1, . . . , dr) is True inM ′. SinceZ was
arbitrary,M ′ |= φ.
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{a1, . . . , aB}. LetM1 ⊆M2 ⊆M ′. Then sinceM2 ⊆M ′,
for each k−ary P ∈ Σ, M2 |= P (b1, . . . , bk) ↔ M ′ |=
P (b1, . . . , bk) ↔ M∗ |= P (f(b1), . . . , f(bk)). Then by
a similar argument as the one shown above, we can infer
that M2 |= φ. Thus M ′ has the extensible bounded core
property where the core has domain-size≤ B.
Interestingly, in the above construction, we note that in
making φ True in M2, the ‘inner’ existential variables
always take values from a fixed set of size B, namely
{a1, . . . , aB}. Then we construct the formula ψ as given
in the proof of Theorem 1 (in section 3) i.e.
ψ = ∃x1 . . . ∃xB∀z0∀z1 . . . ∀zr (χ) where
χ = (
∨
u1∈V
. . .
∨
ur∈V
ξ(z, v1 7→ u1, . . . , vr 7→ ur))
Then we can see that on account of the extensible bounded
core property of M ′, M ′ |= ψ. As shown above, for any
model M of domain-size ≥ B, we can construct a model
M ′ having the same domain as M and which has the ex-
tensible bounded core property. Then the spectrum of φ is
a subset of the spectrum of ψ. Clearly it is the case that if
M |= ψ, then M |= φ. Then the spectrum of ψ is a subset
of the spectrum of φ. Then we conclude that φ and ψ have
the same spectrum. Thus we can answer any questions re-
garding the spectrum of φ by just asking the same questions
of the spectrum of ψ which is a BSRΣ sentence.
While we do not know whether this property extends to the
whole of EBSΣ(∅) with equality, in some cases it does.
Consider a sentence φ in the Gurevich class seen above. As
shown in the proof of Lemma 4, for every model M of φ,
as above, one can construct M ′ by changing only the inter-
pretations of the ‘function’ predicates (and by keeping the
interpretations of the other predicates as inM ) such thatM ′
has the above mentioned extensible bounded core property.
5.3 The SAT problem for the EBSΣ(∅) class
Lemma 7 If ϕ ∈ EBSΣ(∅), the following problems are
decidable:
(i) Is ϕ satisfiable?
(ii) Does ϕ have a finite model?
Proof: By Lemma 2, if ϕ ∈ EBS, it is either unsatisfiable
or has a finite model of size atmost B, where B is the fi-
nite cardinal in Lemma 2. By Herbrand’s theorem, if ϕ is
unsatisfiable, there must exist a finite set of ground clauses
of ϕ that is propositionally unsatisfiable. We can therefore
construct a decision procedure by interleaving steps of the
following:
– A procedure that recursively enumerates the ground
clauses in the Herbrand Universe of ϕ and checks
the propositional unsatisfiability of finite subsets of
ground clauses, and
– A procedure that recursively enumerates finite models
of ϕ and checks whether ϕ is true in the model.
Since ϕ is either unsatisfiable or has a finite model of size
at most B, one of these is guaranteed to terminate. If we
terminate by detecting unsatisifability of ϕ, then ϕ has no
model. Otherwise, we terminate with a finite model of
ϕ. This gives us a decision procedure that serves to check
satisfiability of ϕ and also detects if ϕ has a finite model.
Now BSRΣ ⊆ EBSΣ(Σ) ⊆ EBSΣ(σ) for σ ⊆ Σ. Since
the SAT problem for BSRΣ is NEXPTIME-complete, the
SAT problem for EBSΣ(σ) for any σ ⊆ Σ (and in particu-
lar σ = ∅), is atleast NEXPTIME-hard.
For some special subclasses of EBSΣ(∅), we identify be-
low the complexity of the SAT problem for these subclasses.
Lemma 8 Assume a sub-class S of EBSΣ(∅) for which B
for every sentence φ of the sub-class is atmost f(φ) where
f : S → N is an efficiently (polynomial time) computable
function. Then SAT-S ∈ NTIME(f(φ)O(|φ|)) where SAT-S
denotes the SAT problem for S and |φ| denotes the length of
φ.
Proof :
Given a formula φ ∈ S ⊆ EBSΣ(∅), we construct a Turing
machine which does the following:
1. It first brings φ to its PCNF ϕ. The time taken to do so
is O(|φ|). The length of ϕ, i.e. |ϕ| = O(|φ|).
2. It computes B = f(φ). The time taken for this is
O(q(|φ|)) where q is some polynomial.
3. It then guesses a number n between 0 and B. It then
constructs the set {1, . . . , n} which would serve as the
universe UM of a Σ−structure M . The time required
to construct the universe is O(n) = O(B).
4. It then guesses the Σ−structure M . Let r be the
number of predicates in φ (r = O(|φ|)). Let s be
the maximum arity of these predicates (s = O(|φ|).
To interpret any predicate P requires specifying the
truth value of P for each s−tuple of arguments from
UM . Then the time required to guess an interpreta-
tion of P is O(ns). Doing so for all predicates re-
quires time O(r · ns) = O(|φ| · n|φ|). Thus the time
to guess the Σ−structure M is O(|φ| · n|φ|). This
also is the size of M which we denote by ‖ M ‖ i.e.
‖M ‖= O(|φ| · n|φ|).
5. It then checks whether M |= ϕ. It does so by enlisting
out all the matrices obtained by instantiating the vari-
ables in the matrix of ϕ with values from UM and then
checking whether these instantiated matrices evaluate
to True in M . Given an instantiated matrix, the time
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O(‖ M ‖ · |ϕ|) = O(‖ M ‖ · |φ|). If the length of the
quantifier prefix of ϕ is p(= O(|ϕ|) = O(|φ|)), then
the number of instantiated matrices is O(np). Then
the total time to check whetherM |= ϕ is O(np) ·O(‖
M ‖ · |φ|) = O(n|φ| · |φ| ·n|φ| · |φ|) = O(n2·|φ| · |φ|2).
If M |= ϕ, then the TM returns Yes (i.e. ϕ and hence φ
is satisfiable and also would have constructed the model
M satisfying it). If all computations of M fail, then it
indeed must be that ϕ and hence φ is unsatisfiable due to
the bounded model property of φ. Thus M decides the
satisfiability of φ.
The time taken for any computation =
Time to compute ϕ (A) + Time to compute f (B) + Time
taken to guess n (C) + Time taken to guessM with universe
of size n (D) + Time taken to check if M |= ϕ (E)
Now (C) + (D) + (E)
= O(n) + O(|φ| · n|φ|) + O(n2·|φ| · |φ|2)
= O(n2·|φ| · |φ|2)
= O(nO(|φ|))
Then (A) + (B) + (C) + (D) + (E)
= O(|φ|) + O(q(|φ|)) + O(nO(|φ|))
= O(nO(|φ|))
= O(f(φ)O(|φ|))
Thus SAT-S ∈ NTIME(f(φ)O(|φ|)).
We get the following immediately as a consequence of the
above Lemma.
Corollary 2 If for the sub-class S satisfying the conditions
of Lemma 8, f(φ) ≤ 2p(|φ|) for some polynomial p, then
SAT-S ∈ NEXPTIME. If S contains BSRΣ, then SAT-S is
NEXPTIME-complete.
We shall look at one such class as stated in the above lemma
later in section 8).
6 Characterizing the spectra of the EBSΣ(σ)
classes
The spectrum of a sentence φ is defined as the set of car-
dinalities of all the finite models of φ. The spectrum of φ
is thus a subset of N. It was proved by Ramsey [2] that
the spectrum of any sentence in BSRΣ is either finite or
co-finite. By Theorem 1 (in section 3), since BSRΣ is the
syntactic characterization of EBSΣ(Σ), it follows that the
spectrum of any EBSΣ(Σ) sentence is also finite or co-
finite.
Let FΣ be the set of all FOΣ sentences which have finite or
co-finite spectra. Then from above, EBSΣ(Σ) ⊆ FΣ. We
now ask: how does EBSΣ(σ) compare with FΣ?
Lemma 2 (in section 5.1) immediately shows that
EBSΣ(∅) = FΣ.
Thus for any Σ, EBSΣ(∅) is exactly the set of all FOΣ
sentences which have finite or co-finite spectra.
From Theorem 2 (in section 4.1), this implies that unless
Σ contains only monadic predicates, for each non-empty
σ ⊆ Σ,
EBSΣ(σ) ( FΣ
If Σ contains only monadic predicates, we have
EBSΣ(Σ) = FΣ
This then answers the question posed above. FΣ is exactly
EBSΣ(σ) if Σ has only monadic predicates. If Σ contains
atleast one predicate of arity ≥ 2, then EBSΣ(σ) is a strict
semantic subset of FΣ for a non-empty σ ⊆ Σ.
Let for a set A of sentences, S(A) denote the set of spectra
of the sentences in A. We then ask the question: How do
S(EBSΣ(σ)) for different σ compare?
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Consider a set S which is finite or co-finite. Then
there exists a BSR∅ formula whose spectrum is S.
Proof :
Suppose S is finite. Let S = {k1, . . . , kn}. For each ki,
construct φi as follows:
φi = ∃x1 . . . ∃xki∀y((
j=ki∧
j=1
l=ki∧
l=j+1
(xj 6= xl))∧
j=ki∨
j=1
(y = xj))
φi asserts that there are exactly ki elements in any model of
φi. Then the formula
φS =
i=n∨
i=1
φi
has a spectrum which is exactly S. Note that since φS is a
disjunction of BSR∅ sentences, φS ∈ BSR∅.
Suppose S is co-finite. Then let
S = {k1, k2, . . . , kn} ∪ {B + i | i ≥ 0} for some n > 0
where B is larger than all the kis.
For each ki, we construct φi as shown above. We also con-
struct the following sentence φB
φB = ∃x1 . . . ∃xB(
j=B∧
j=1
l=B∧
l=j+1
(xj 6= xl))
Then the spectrum of φB is exactly {B + i | i ≥ 0}. Then
the formula
φS = (
i=n∨
i=1
φi) ∨ φB
has spectrum which is exactly S. Again since φS is a
disjunction of BSR∅ sentences, φS ∈ BSRΣ.
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Then for every Σ, there exists a BSRΣ formula whose spec-
trum is S.
Proof :
By Lemma 9, there exists a BSR∅ formula φS whose spec-
trum is S. Then consider the formula ψS given by
ψS = φS ∧
∧
Q∈Σ
∀zQQ(zQ)
where zQ is a vector of variables of length equal to the arity
of Q. Any finite model of ψS is also a model of φS and
hence its cardinality must be in S. Conversely, for any k ∈
S, there is a model of φS whose cardinality is k. Since φS is
over the empty vocabulary, this model is just a universe of
size k. Then this model can be expanded to a model of ψS
by interpreting all the predicates of Σ as ‘fully’ True.
Thus the spectrum of ψS is exactly S.
From the above, we see that for any Σ, S(BSRΣ) is
exactly the set of all finite and co-finite sets. Then
since from Theorems 1 (section 3) and 2(1) (section 4.1),
BSRΣ ⊆ EBSΣ(Σ) ⊆ EBSΣ(σ) ⊆ FΣ, we have that
S(EBSΣ(σ)) is exactly the set of all finite and co-finite
sets. Thus, for all Σ and all σ ⊆ Σ, we have a complete
characterization of the spectra of EBSΣ(σ) as the set of all
finite and co-finite sets.
Further since any EBS∅(∅) sentence φ can be easily ex-
tended to a sentence of EBSΣ(σ) which has the same spec-
trum as φ, the EBS∅(∅) class can be seen as the ‘minimum’
class in the EBS heirarchy whose set of all spectra is ex-
actly the set of all finite and co-finite sets.
7 Undecidability of the EBSΣ(σ) classes
While the satisfiability problem for EBSΣ(σ) is decidable,
the membership problem for EBSΣ(σ) is not always de-
cidable. Below we look at the cases where EBSΣ(σ) is
decidable and where it is undecidable. In the latter case, we
show a reduction from the halting problem.
As shown in [7], while the set of all those TMs which halt
on the empty tape is undecidable, researchers set out to find
out subsets of this set, which are undecidable. For any pair
(s, l) of natural numbers, define the set A(s,l) to be the set
of all the TMs having s + 1 states (including the halting
state) and l symbols (including the blank symbol). Then it
can be shown ( [7]) that ifA(s,l) is undecidable, thenA(x,y)
is undecidable for s ≤ x and l ≤ y. A set R of seven such
pairs (s, l) have been identified ( [7]) such that A(s,l) is un-
decidable and further these are such that there remain only
a fixed finite number of pairs (x, y) for which the decidabil-
ity status of A(x,y) is unknown. We use this set R in the
theorem below.
Theorem 3 For any σ ⊆ Σ,
1. If Σ contains only unary predicates, EBSΣ(σ) is de-
cidable.
2. If Σ contains at least s+1 unary predicates and atleast
l + 1 predicates of arity ≥ 2, where (s, l) ∈ R, then
EBSΣ(σ) is undecidable.
Proof:
Statement (1) above is easy to see. If Σ contains only unary
predicates, then as seen earlier, EBSΣ(σ) = EBSΣ(Σ) =
FOΣ. Then checking membership is trivial.
We now consider statement (2) above. Consider the pair
(s, l). Then as mentioned above, A(s,l) is undecidable. We
show a reduction from A(s,l) to the set EBSΣ(σ) which is
the complement of the set EBSΣ(σ). Clearly EBSΣ(σ) is
decidable iff EBSΣ(σ) is decidable.
Consider M1 ∈ A(s,l). Let M1 = (Q,Σ,∆, δ1, q0, {h})
be a deterministic Turing Machine (DTM) with a two-way
infinite tape, where Q is the set of states such that |Q| =
s+1, Σ represents the input alphabet, ∆ represents the tape
alphabet such that |∆| = l, δ1 : Q×∆→ Q×∆×{L,R}
represents the deterministic transition function, q0 repre-
sents the starting state and h represents the unique halting
state.
We first modify M1 to a new DTM M = (Q ∪
{t} ,Σ,∆, δ, q0, ∅), where t 6∈ Q and
δ(q, i) = δ1(q, i), ∀q ∈ Q \ {h}, ∀i ∈ ∆;
δ(h, i) = (t, i, R), δ(t, i) = (h, i, L) ∀i ∈ ∆
Thus M mimics the behaviour of M1 exactly except when
M1 reaches the halting state h. On reaching this state, M
loops between states h and t forever. Note that M does not
have a halting state.
Next, we construct a sentence ΦM ∈ FOΣ such that mod-
els of ΦM represent computations ofM on the empty input
tape that end in state t. For this, we proceed exactly as in
the proof of Trakhtenbrot’s theorem as presented in [6, pp
165-168] (details are therefore omitted here). We make the
following slight changes though.
1. The proof in [6] uses only binary predicates whereas
the arity ≥ 2 predicates of Σ need not necessarily be
binary. But it is easy to see that binary predicates can
always be simulated using higher arity predicates (as
was shown earlier in section 4.1).
2. The proof in [6] introduces a binary predicate
Hq(p, n) for each state q where Hq(p, n) denotes that
at time n, M is in state q and its head is at position
p on the tape. We instead separate the state and the
head-position information by using a unary predicate
Uq(n) for each state q ∈ Q and a arity ≥ 2 predicate
H . H(p, n, . . . , n) is True iff the head is at position p
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n. If for a given n, all Uq(n)’s are False, it would
be taken to mean that at time n, M is state t. The
constraints can easily be recast in terms of these pred-
icates. The total number of unary predicates needed
above is s+ 1 - which is possible to use from Σ since
Σ contains atleast s+ 1 unary predicates.
3. The proof in [6] uses the constant min. We get rid
of this constant and replace all its occurences with a
variable say x which will be existentially quantified.
Since M uses a two-way infinite tape, we remove the
constraint that x is the minimum element. xwould just
be some element which would represent the start time.
4. The proof in [6] considers the tape alphabet to be
{0.1}. But the same constraints as for this tape al-
phabet, can be written for any general tape alphabet,
in particular ∆. Then one binary predicate Pa(p, n)
would be used for each a ∈ ∆ with the constraint
that for any (p, n) exactly one these predicates is True.
That requires l binary predicates for all symbols to-
gether. But we use only l − 1 arity ≥ 2 predicates -
one predicate Pa for each symbol in Σ and assert that
atmost one such predicate is True for each (p, n). The
case when all the Pa’s are False will be taken to mean
that the blank symbol is present at position p at time n.
The total number of arity≥ 2 predicates needed would
be l− 1 (for the Pa predicates) + 1 (forH) + 1 (for the
linear order) = l + 1. These can be used from Σ since
Σ contains alteast l + 1 arity ≥ 2 predicates.
5. The proof in [6] assumes a complete DTM. Here we
do not require it to be so. Hence we need to capture
the condition that M might halt on a state q - which is
not the halting state - just because there is no transition
out from the state on the symbol a currently under the
head (Clearly the input is not accepted by this halting).
Then we add the following constraint φ in Φ1 for each
such q and a:
last(y) = ∀x((x 6= y)→ (x < y))
φ(y) = ∀n∀p((Uq(n) ∧ H(p, n, . . . , n) ∧
Pa(p, n, . . . , n))→
∨
q∈Q Uq(last(y)))
where Pa(p, n, . . . , n) is True iff at time n, the symbol
at position p on the tape is a. φ then asserts that if
q and a are as mentioned above, the last state of the
computation is not t.
6. The last condition is changed to assert that the last state
of the computation is t
Φ2 = ∃x(last(x) ∧
∧
q∈Q ¬Uq(x)).
7. For all those P ∈ Σ which were not used in the
constraints above, we just add the constraint ψP =
∀zPP (zP ) where zP is a vector of length equal to
the arity of P . These additional constraints are just
to make ΦM have signature equal to Σ.
The above constructed ΦM can be seen to be in FOΣ. We
now observe that.
A) A Σ−structure M with |UM | = α for some cardinal
α is a model of ΦM iff M represents a computation
of length α of the DTM M (on the empty input tape)
which ends in state t.
We now show that M1 halts on the empty input tape iff
ΦM ∈ EBSΣ(σ).
If part: Suppose M1 does not halt at the halting state
h. Then M either halts at a non-halting state or it has
an infinite computation that does not through t. In either
case, no computation of it ends in t. Since by (A) above,
there is a 1-1 correspondance between computations of M
that end in state t and the models of φM, we find that
φM is unsatisfiable. Then φM ∈ EBSΣ(σ) trivially. So
φM /∈ EBSΣ(σ).
Only if part: Suppose that M1 halts at the halting state h.
Let N be the length of the ‘halting’ computation of M1.
ThenM reaches h for the first time after N steps. We have
the following two observations:
1. Consider the computation ofM of lengthN+2k (k ≥
0) (since M is a DTM, there is only one computation
of length N + 2k for each k). By the construction of
M, every such computation ends in state h (and hence
not at t). Then from observation (A) above, ΦM has
no model of size N + 2k for all k ≥ 0.
2. Consider the computation of M of length N + 2k +
1 (k ≥ 0). By construction, the computation ends in
state t. Then by (A) above, there exists a model of ΦM
of size N + 2k + 1, for every k ≥ 0.
Suppose that ΦM ∈ EBSΣ(∅). From observation (2),
we know that ΦM has infinitely many models. Then by
Lemma 2 (in section 5.1), there exists a finite cardinal B
such that ΦM has a model of every size larger than B. How-
ever, from observation (1), we know that by taking any k
such that N + 2k > B, ΦM has no model of size N + 2k.
Therefore, ΦM /∈ EBSΣ(∅). Then since EBSΣ(σ) ⊆
EBSΣ(∅) we conclude that ΦM ∈ EBSΣ(σ).
Thus M1 halts iff ΦM ∈ EBSΣ(σ). Thus EBSΣ(σ) is
undecidable. Hence EBSΣ(σ) is undecidable.
The above proof ofcourse leaves out the Σs which contain
s + 1 unary predicates and l + 1 predicates of arity ≥ 2
where the decidability status of A(s,l) is unknown. We do
not have an answer yet for the decidability of EBSΣ(σ) for
these Σs but we conjecture that these must be undecidable
as well.
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that EBSΣ(σ) is undecidable, it does not tell us whether
these are r.e. or co-r.e. Indeed we do not have an answer
yet to this question as well for all σ. For the case of σ = Σ,
the EBSΣ(Σ) class has a syntactic characterization in the
form of BSRΣ. Then as seen in section 3, EBSΣ(Σ) is
r.e. and not co-r.e. If likewise, for the other σ’s too, we
can find a syntactic characterization for them or in general a
characterization in terms of any recursive class of formulae,
then we know that they also would be r.e. and not co-r.e.
8 A Syntactic sub-class of EBSΣ(σ)
BSRΣ gave a good starting point as a syntactic characteri-
zation of EBSΣ(Σ). In this section, we attempt to provide
a syntactic characterization of a fragment of the EBSΣ(σ)
class. Without loss of generality, let ϕ be an FOΣ sentence
in prenex conjunctive normal form (PCNF). As usual, we
consider Σ as a relational vocabulary. Let V (ϕ), EV (ϕ)
and AV (ϕ) denote respectively the set of the leftmost ex-
istential, non-leftmost (or ‘inner’) existential and universal
variables of ϕ. We introduce the following classification of
predicates and their arguments in ϕ.
1. The ith argument (call it x) of an instance of predicate
P in ϕ is called (a) free if x ∈ V (ϕ) (b) universal if
x ∈ AV (ϕ), and (c) existential if x ∈ EV (ϕ).
2. The free support set of an instance I of P in ϕ is the
set of all variables in V (ϕ) that appear as arguments of
I . Likewise, the existential and universal support sets
of an instance I of P in ϕ are the sets of variables in
EV (ϕ) and AV (ϕ) respectively that appear as argu-
ments of I .
3. An instance I of predicate P in ϕ is called (a) free if its
existential and universal support sets are both empty,
(b) universal if its existential support set is empty and
universal support set is non-empty, and (c) existen-
tial otherwise, i.e., if its existential support set is non-
empty. Note that an existential instance of P may have
a universal argument.
4. Predicate P in ϕ is called (a) free if every instance of
P in ϕ is free, (b) universal if every instance of P in
ϕ is either universal or free and atleast one instance is
universal, (c) existential if atleast one instance of P in
ϕ is existential. Note that an existential predicate may
have a universal or free instance.
5. Two instances of predicate P in ϕ are said to be ex-
istentially distinguishable with respect to variable v if
there is an integer i such that (i) the ith argument of
each instance is either free or existential (i.e. not uni-
versal) and (ii) v appears as the ith argument of one
instance but not as the ith argument of the other in-
stance (thus v ∈ EV (ϕ) ∪ V (ϕ)).
6. An instance I of a predicate P is said to have +ve
polarity in ϕ (or I is +ve in ϕ) if it appears un-negated
in ϕ. It is said to have −ve polarity in ϕ (or I is −ve
in ϕ) if it appears negated in ϕ.
As an example, consider the sentence
ϕ = ∃y∃u∀v∃w (P (y, y) ∨ ¬Q(u, y) ∨R(y, v))∧
(Q(v, u) ∨ P (y, u) ∧ ¬R(w, v)))
Here V (ϕ) = {y, u}, AV (ϕ) = {v} and EV (ϕ) = {w}.
For P , the free, universal and existential support sets of the
first instance are {y}, ∅ and ∅ respectively, while those of
the second instance are {y, u}, ∅ and ∅ respectively. Both
instances are free and hence predicate P is free. The first
instance of Q is free while the second instance is universal
as its universal support set is {v} 6= ∅ and its existential sup-
port set is ∅. Hence Q is universal. The first instance of R
is universal while its second instance is existential since its
existential support set is {w} 6= ∅. Hence R is existential.
Also the two instances of R are existentially distinguish-
able w.r.t. w since (i) the first argument of each instance
is not universal and (ii) w appears as the first argument of
the second instance but not as the first argument of the first
instance. Finally, the first instance of R is +ve i.e. has +ve
polarity while the second instance of R is −ve i.e. has −ve
polarity in ϕ.
Let U denote the set of all unary predicates of Σ. Let F ,A
denote respectively the set of all free and universal predi-
cates of Σ. Let EU denote the set of all variables in EV (ϕ)
which appear in ϕ as the argument of some unary predicate.
Let EU = EV (ϕ) \ EU.
Definition 2 (The EDPΣ(σ) class) Let ϕ be a FOΣ sen-
tence in PCNF. Then ϕ is said to have Existentially Dis-
tinguishable Predicates preserving σ ⊆ Σ if the following
hold:
1. σ ⊆ U ∪ F ∪A
2. Equality (if present) ∈ F ∪ A.
3. For any existential predicate P of arity ≥ 2, every
pair of instances of P appearing in ϕ in different
clauses and with different polarities, must be existen-
tially distinguishable with respect to atleast one exis-
tential variable outside EU.
The set of all FOΣ sentences having existentially distin-
guishable predicates preserving σ is called the EDPΣ(σ)
class.
Note that a unary predicate or a predicate with arity
≥ 2 that is free or universal in ϕ can be either in σ
15or in Σ \ σ. As an example, consider the sentence
ϕ = ∃x∃y∀z∃v((P (x, z) ∨R(y, z))∧
(¬P (v, y) ∨ P (z, y)) ∧ (¬R(x, z) ∨ (z = x)))
Here, Σ = {P,R}, U = F = ∅, A = {R,=} and EU = ∅.
Consider σ ⊆ Σ such thatP /∈ σ. Then we can see that con-
ditions 1 and 2 in the EDP definition are satisfied. Pred-
icate P is existential as its second instance P (v, y) is ex-
istential. For the first and second instances of P from the
left, the second instance is existential and lies in a different
clause and with different polarity w.r.t. the first instance.
Indeed then v /∈ EU existentially distinguishes the two in-
stances. The second and third instances of P have different
polarities but lie in the same clause. The first and third in-
stances of P lie in different clauses but have the same po-
larity. Then these pairs trivially satisfy condition 3 of the
EDP definition. Hence ϕ ∈ EDPΣ(σ).
If P ∈ σ, then ϕ /∈ EDPΣ(σ) for any such σ. This is be-
cause P is existential and condition 1 in Definition 2 allows
only free or universal predicates with arity ≥ 2 to be in σ.
As a second example, consider
ψ = ∃x∀z∃v(P (v, z) ∨Q(z)) ∧ (P (x, v) ∨ ¬Q(v))
Here, Σ = {P,Q}, F = A = {},U = {Q}. Both P and
Q have two instances in different clauses and for each of P
and Q, one of its instances is existential. But for P , both its
instances are of the same polarity. ForQ, we find that its in-
stances even have opposite polarities, but Q is unary. Then
both P and Q satisfy condition 3 of Definition 2 trivially.
Hence ψ(x) ∈ EDPΣ({Q}) and ψ(x) /∈ EDPΣ(Σ).
Lemma 10 Let ϕ be a FOΣ sentence in PCNF in which
1. For every existential predicate P of arity ≥ 2 in Σ,
either (a) all instances ofP inϕ have the same polarity
or (b) all instances of P appear in a single clause.
2. The equality predicate, if present, has free or universal
arguments in all its instances.
Then there exists σ ⊆ Σ such that ϕ ∈ EDPΣ(σ).
Proof: Let σ ⊆ Σ be the (possibly empty) set of unary
predicates alongwith the predicates of arity ≥ 2 that are
either free or universal in ϕ. Then it easily follows from
Definition 2 that ϕ ∈ EDPΣ(σ).
8.1 The EDPΣ(σ) class as a syntactic frag-
ment of the EBSΣ(σ) class
Theorem 4 Let ϕ be a FOΣ sentence in EDPΣ(σ). Let k
be the number of unary predicates in Σ. Then ϕ satisfies all
conditions in Definition 1 (of section 2) with B = |V (ϕ)|+
|EU|+ 2
k
.
Before proving this result, we see that this theorem imme-
diately implies the following.
Corollary 4 ∀σ ⊆ Σ, EDPΣ(σ) ⊆ EBSΣ(σ).
Thus EDPΣ(σ) is a syntactic fragment of EBSΣ(σ). We
shall explore the quesrion of whether EDPΣ(σ) is a syn-
tactic characterization of EBSΣ(σ) in the forthcoming sec-
tions. We now present the proof of Theorem 4. The proof
is a bit long so while the interested reader is urged to go
through it, the proof if skipped would not affect the flow.
8.1.1 Proving Theorem 4
We prove a stronger version of Theorem 4 namely for for-
mulae with free variables. The results naturally follows for
sentences too.
For the case of free variables, the EBS definition is slightly
widened to also assert that if M |= ϕ(a) where a is a vector
of elements from M , then M1 must contain a. The other
conditions remain exactly the same.
Our proof is motivated by the proof of finite model size
of formulae in the Lo¨wenheim class and the Bernays-
Scho¨nfinkel-Ramsey class, as given in [2].
Consider a Σ−structure M with universe UM and a ∈ U |x|M
such that M |= ϕ(a) and |UM | > m+ |V (ϕ(x))|+ |EU|+
2k.
Now we have that |C| = m and |U| = k. Let A′ ⊆ UM
be the set of interpretations of the constants of C in the
model M . Let A′′ ⊆ UM be the set of values assigned
to variables in V (ϕ(x)) in showing that M |= ϕ(a) (The
existential variables in EV (ϕ(x)) being the leftmost, the
values assigned to them in M are independent of the values
of all the universal variables). Thus, A′′ contains all values
in a and also values assigned to variables bound to the
leftmost existential quantifiers in ϕ(x). Clearly, |A′| ≤ m
and |A′′| ≤ |V (ϕ(x))|. Since as per our terminology, all
the arguments belonging to V (ϕ(x)) ∪ C are called free
arguments, we denote by Free the set V (ϕ(x)) ∪ C and by
Val(Free) the set of values in M , for the elements of Free
i.e. Val(Free) = A′ ∪ A′′.
Without loss of generality, let U = {Q1, . . . , Qk}. For ev-
ery element e in the universe UM , we associate a binary
vector or colour C(e) ∈ {0, 1}k, where the ith component
of C(e) is 1 iff M |= Qi(e). For every c ∈ {0, 1}k, let UcM
denote the subset of elements of UM that have the colour c.
Consider the set VcM = UcM \ Val(Free). We now choose a
subset Ac of VcM as follows: if VcM = ∅, then Ac = VcM =
∅; otherwise, Ac is a singleton set formed by selecting any
element ac from VcM (i.e. Ac = {ac}).
Let EU = EV (ϕ(x)) \ EU denote the complement of EU
within EV (ϕ(x)). EU denotes the set of all variables of
EV (ϕ(x)) that do not appear in ϕ(x) as an argument of any
instance of any unary predicate. Then we finally choose a
subset of UM of size |EU|which we denote as Val(EU) such
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⋂
Val(Free) = ∅ and (ii) Val(EU)
⋂
Ac =
∅ for all colours c ∈ {0, 1}k.
Note that
|Val(Free)|+ |Val(EU)|+Σc∈{0,1}k |Ac|
≤ |A′|+ |A′′|+ |EU|+Σc∈{0,1}k1
≤ m+ |V (ϕ(x))|+ |EU|+ 2k
so that we can indeed choose the subset Val(EU) of
UM of the mentioned size. We denote the elements
of Val(EU) as ai where i is such that vi ∈ EU (thus
Val(EU) = {ai|vi ∈ EU}). Note that the sets Val(Free),
Val(EU) and Ac are all disjoint with each other for each
c ∈ {0, 1}k. Further Ac1 and Ac2 are also disjoint with
each other for all c1, c2 ∈ {0, 1}k where c1 6= c2.
We now consider the sub-structure M1 of M generated by
Val(Free) ∪ Val(EU) ∪
⋃
c∈{0,1}k A
c
. We show that this
sub-structure M1 satisfies all of the EBS conditions with
B = m+ |V (ϕ(x))|+ |EU|+ 2k.
Since ϕ(x) is in prenex normal form, we assume without
loss of generality that
ϕ(x) = ∃vleftmost∀z0∃v1∀z1∃v2∀z2 . . .∃vr∀zr
ψ(x, vleftmost, z0, v1, z1, . . . vr, zr)
where ψ is a quantifier-free matrix in CNF, vleftmost
denotes the (possibly empty) set of variables bound to
the leftmost quantifiers (all of these variables are thus
in V (ϕ(x))), r denotes |EV (ϕ(x))| and zi denotes
the (possibly empty) vector of universally quantified
variables that appear immediately to the right of the
existentially quantified variable vi in the quantifier
prefix of ϕ(x). Let z = (z0, z1, . . . , zr) denote the
tuple of all the AV (ϕ(x)) variables and v = (v1, v2,
. . . , vr) denote the tuple of all the EV (ϕ(x)) variables.
For every extension M2 of M1 within M , we now describe
how to construct a Σ−structure M ′2 such that UM2 = UM ′2 ,
M ′2 |= ϕ(a) and M ′2|σ =M2|σ .
If M2 |= ϕ(a), we simply choose M ′2 = M2. Clearly, this
choice satisfies the EBS conditions. If M2 6|= ϕ(a), we
must redefine the interpretations of (some) predicates in
Σ \ σ such that the resulting structure M ′2 is a model of
ϕ(a). We note that this M ′2 has the same universe namely
UM2 as M i.e. UM ′2 = UM2 . Therefore henceforth we will
refer to the universe of M ′2 as UM2 .
The way we proceed is we first create a quasi Σ−structure
M3 which has the universe UM2 and such that ϕ(a) is True
in it. It is quasi in the sense that it gives atleast one truth
value to each predicate of Σ for each valuation of its ar-
guments. In other words, it could give both truth values
to a predicate for certain valuations of its arguments. The
desired M ′2 would then be extracted out from this quasi
Σ−structure M3.
In the following, we overload the |= symbol so that we de-
note ϕ(a) being True in M3 as M3 |= ϕ(a).
Now, in order to get M3, we observe that for every assign-
ment of values Z from UM2 to the universally quantified
variables z in ϕ(a), we must choose a value from UM2 for
each of the constants in C and each of the existentially quan-
tified variables, namely the variables in vleftmost and those
in v, such thatψ(x, vleftmost, z0, v1, z1, . . . vr, zr) instantiated
with these values evaluates to True in M3. Suppose we are
indeed able to choose these values from UM2 . Upon sub-
stitution of these values in ψ, call the resulting fully instan-
tiated matrix as ψM3 [Z] (Note the square brackets in the
notation which are used to mean that Z is considered as an
‘input’ to give as ‘output’, a fully instantiated matrix de-
noted as ψM3 [Z]. It should not be looked at as meaning that
ψM3 is a formula whose free variables are being instantiated
with Z - in that case we would use round brackets around
Z).
Before proceeding ahead, we observe that there are two
tasks to be done. The first is, given a valuation Z of the uni-
versal variables, choosing the values for the constants and
all the existential variables to substitute in ψ to get ψM3 [Z].
The second is to define the (quasi) structureM3 over which
ψM3 [Z] evaluates to True for each valuation Z from UM2 of
the z variables so that as a result M3 |= ϕ(a).
For the first task, we choose the values as follows:
1. For each constant in C, we interpret it in M3 with the
same value with which it is interpreted in M . Like-
wise for each variable of V (ϕ((x)), we substitute for
it the same value which is assigned to it in M (This
is possible since Val(Free) ⊆ UM2 ). These values of
course are independent of the instantiations Z for the z
variables. This takes care of all elements of Free.
2. For each variable vi ∈ EU, we assign it the value ai ∈
Val(EU) ⊆ UM2 . These values too are independent of
the instantiations of the z variables.
3. Given a valuation Z of the z variables, for each variable
vi ∈ EU, we do the following. We turn to the modelM
and look at the assignment made to the v variables in ψ
for this valuation, namely Z, of the z variables. Since
M |= ϕ(a), we know that there exists a choice of val-
ues from UM for each existentially quantified variable
and the constants such that when these values are sub-
stituted in ψ(x, vleftmost, z0, v1, z1, . . . vr, zr), we get a
fully instantiated matrix - which we denote as ψM [Z] -
which evaluates to True in M . Let d be the value sub-
stituted for vi from UM in making ψM [Z] True in M .
Let c be the colour of d in M .
(a) If d belongs to Val(Free), then we choose the
17same value d to substitute for vi from UM2 (This
is possible because Val(Free) ⊆ UM2 ).
(b) If d is not in Val(Free), then we choose the value
ac ∈ Ac ⊆ UM2 to substitute for vi.
Using the above procedure (call it Selector), for each valua-
tion Z of the z variables, we determine the values to assign
to each of the existential variables and constants and sub-
stituting all these values in ψ, we get the fully instantitated
matrix ψM3 [Z].
We now take up the second task namely defining M3 such
that M3 |= ϕ(a).
Before proceeding ahead, we introduce a little terminology
to make further explanations easier. If I denotes the in-
stance of a predicate P in ψ, we denote by IM [Z], the in-
stance I as it appears in ψM [Z] (Thus IM [Z] would look
like P (d) where the values in d come from UM ). Likewise
we denote by IM3 [Z], the instance I as it appears in ψM3 [Z].
Then for each valuation Z of the z variables, for each predi-
cate P ∈ Σ∪ {=} and for each instance I of P in ψ, we do
the following:
1. If P is nullary (i.e. constant), then we have already
stated above how P must be interpreted in M3.
2. If P ∈ U, then IM3 [Z] is assigned the same truth
value in M3 as IM [Z] has in M . In other words
M3 |= IM3 [Z] iff M |= IM [Z].
3. If P is atleast 2-ary, we have the following:
(a) If P is a free or universal predicate, then IM3 [Z]
is assigned a truth value such that M3 |= IM3 [Z]
iff M |= IM [Z].
(b) If P is an existential predicate, then IM3 [Z] is
assigned a truth value such that
– M3 |= IM3 [Z] if I is +ve in ψ and
– M3 |= ¬IM3 [Z] if I is −ve in ψ.
By the above, for each valuation Z of z, since either we have
given an instance in ψM3 [Z] the same truth value in M3 as
the corresponding instance in ψM [Z] has in M or we have
made the literal corresponding to the instance True in M3,
we can see that ψM3 [Z] is true in M3 since ψM [Z] is true in
M .
We note now that by the above procedure, we would have
interpreted in M3 (i.e. given truth values in M3 to) all the
predicates in Σ for those values of their arguments which
were seen in the ‘ψM3 [Z]’s that were obtained when enlist-
ing all the valuations Z of the universally quantified vari-
ables. Lets call this whole procedure as procedure P1.
In general, P1 might not exhaust all possible argument
values for all the predicates and hence the interpretation of
the predicates in M3 would be partial and incomplete. In
order to give the complete interpretation in M3 for each
predicate in Σ, we need to consider for each predicate,
those values for its arguments that were not covered by P1.
As for the interpretations of the predicates for these values
(i.e. which were not covered by P1), it doesnt matter in
which way they are interpreted because these values do
not in any way contribute towards making ψM3 [Z] True
in M3 for any valuation Z from UM2 of the z variables
(and hence in showing M3 |= ϕ(a)). Hence, in particular,
they could be interpreted as they are in M . Lets call this
procedure of assignment of truth values to the predicates
of Σ for their remaining argument values as procedure
P2. Clearly procedures P1 and P2 completely define in
M3, the interpretations of all predicates for all values of
their arguments. Further they define interpretations of the
predicates for disjoint sets of values of their arguments.
Having definedM3, we now see that it is possible that above
procedures P1 and P2 together give interpretations to the
predicates of Σ in M3 that cause a conflict i.e. a predicate
being assigned both True and False values in M3 for the
same values of its arguments. Conflicts thus make M3 a
quasi Σ−structure (and not a Σ−structure). In what follows
we show that either conflicts are prevented by the EDP
conditions or conflicts that are not prevented can be cured
(resolved) without affecting the truth of ϕ(a) in the ‘cured’
M3. In other words, we will be able to construct the desired
model M ′2 by simply curing all the conflicts in M3 (i.e. by
extracting the appropriate truth value in case of a conflict).
Then M ′2 would be a valid Σ−structure giving unique truth
values to each predicate for each valuation of its arguments.
Further M ′2 would be a model for ϕ(a) i.e. M ′2 |= ϕ(a).
Before going ahead, we note that M is clearly free of any
conflicts.
Handling conflicts
Suppose there was a conflict i.e. a predicate P got
assigned both True and False values in M3 for the same
vector of values (say d) as its argument. Then we have the
following cases:
1) Suppose the two different truth values to P (d) are both
assigned by P2. But P2 assigns the same truth values as
in M . This shows that there must be a conflict in M itself
which we know is not the case.
2) Without loss of generality, supposeP (d) is assignedTrue
by P1 and False by P2. Then as seen above, since P1 and
P2 give truth values for disjoint sets of values of arguments,
P (d) would be assigned a truth value either only by P1 or
only by P2 contradicting the assumption above.
3) P (d) is assigned both the truth values by P1. We abbre-
viate the truth value True as t and False as f . Having seen
18how the procedure P1 works, we conclude that for each
truth value α ∈ {t, f}, P (d) must then have appeared in
ψM3 [Zα] for some valuation Zα of the z variables where it
was assigned that truth value (namelyα). Let for truth value
α, the instance Iα of P in ψ be instantiated in ψM3 [Zα] to
get P (d). In particular, the instance It of P in ψ gets in-
stantiated in ψM3 [Zt] to get P (d) and the instance If of P
in ψ gets instantiated in ψM3 [Zf ] to get P (d).
Using our notation introduced earlier, the instances men-
tioned above would be denoted as ItM3 [Zt] and I
f
M3
[Zf ] re-
spectively (ItM3 [Zt] = I
f
M3
[Zf ] = P (d)). Further the
former instance is assigned truth value as True and the lat-
ter is assigned False in M3.
Before proceeding ahead, we make the following observa-
tion.
Lemma 11 Consider an instance I in ψ of a predicate P .
Let Z be an instantiation from UM2 , of all the universal vari-
ables z. Then the following are true:
1. For each i ranging from 1 to the arity of P , if either
(i) the ith argument of I in ψ is universal or (ii) the
ith argument of IM3 [Z] is from Val(Free), then the ith
argument of IM [Z] is the same as the ith argument of
IM3 [Z].
2. If I is a free or a universal instance in ψ, then IM [Z]
and IM3 [Z] have the same vector of values appearing
as their arguments.
Proof:
1. (i) If the ith argument is universal, then since ψM3 [Z]
and ψM [Z] have the same valuation of all the universal
variables, namely Z, then in particular for the ith argu-
ment of I , the same value is substituted for it in both
ψM3 [Z] and ψM [Z].
(ii) If the ith argument of IM3 [Z] is from Val(Free),
then it means that the ith argument of I is either (a)
free or (b) universal or (c) a variable in EU. For (a) and
(c), we see directly from cases (1) and (3a) of Selector
that the ith argument of IM [Z] is the same as the ith
argument of IM3 [Z]. For (b), the reasoning is already
presented above.
2. If I is a free or a universal instance, each argument
of it is either free or universal. Then by applying the
reasoning presented in the preceding point to all argu-
ments i ranging from 1 to the arity of P , we can see
that IM [Z] and IM3 [Z] will have the same vector of
values appearing as their arguments.
Coming back to checking for conflicts, we have the follow-
ing possibilities:
1. P is unary. Then d = d (say).
(a) If It and If are free or universal instances, then
from Lemma 11(2), for each truth value α ∈ {t, f},
IαM [Zα] and IαM3 [Zα] have the same value as their ar-
gument (namely d). Then ItM [Zt] = IfM [Zf ] = P (d).
(b) If d ∈ Val(Free), then from Lemma 11(1), we
again see similarly that ItM [Zt] = I
f
M [Zf ] = P (d).
In either of the above cases, from case (2) of P1,
IαM [Zα] and IαM3 [Zα] have the same truth value(namely α) in M and M3 respectively. But then this
shows that P (d) is assigned both truth values in M
thus showing a conflict in M itself which we know
does not exist.
Without loss of generality, suppose It is an existential
instance (i.e. of the form P (v) where v ∈ EV (ϕ(x))).
Note that the argument v cannot belong to EU. The
case when v is assigned the value d ∈ Val(Free) is al-
ready considered above. Then from case 3(b) of Selec-
tor, the only remaining case is when d = ac for some
colour c. Since ac appears as the argument of ItM3 [Zt],
from case (3b) of Selector, it means that the colour of
ac inM is c. If ItM [Zt] = P (d1), then the colour of d1
is also c. Further since by case(2) of P1, M |= ItM [Zt]
iff M3 |= ItM3 [Zt], we have that P (d1) is True in M .
Then since both d1 and ac have the same colour in M ,
we have that P (ac) is also True in M .
Since the argument of IfM3 [Zf ] is also a
c
, it means that
the argument of If is either (i) universal or (ii) existen-
tial (in particular, belonging to EU. In case of (i), by
Lemma 11(2), IfM [Zf ] = IfM3 [Zf ] = P (ac). By case
(2) of P1, M |= IfM [Zf ] iff M3 |= IfM3 [Zf ], so that
P (ac) is False in M . But this is a contradiction.
In case of (ii), suppose IfM [Zf ] = P (d2). Since
IfM3 [Zf ] = P (a
c), by case (3b) of Selector, d2 has
the colour c. Then P (d2) is True in M . But by case
(2) of P1, M |= IfM [Zf ] iff M3 |= IfM3 [Zf ] so that
P (d2) is False in M . Now since d2 and ac have the
same colour in M , we must have that P (ac) is False in
M . This is again a contradiction.
Thus there are no conflicts in M3 as far as the unary
predicates go.
2. P is of arity ≥ 2 and is a free or universal predicate.
Then each of It and If is either universal or free in
ϕ(x). Then from Lemma 11(2), for each truth value
α ∈ {t, f}, IαM [Zα] and IαM3 [Zα] have the same vector
of values as their arguments (namely d). Further by
case (3a) ofP1, both have the same truth value (namely
α) in M andM3 respectively. But then this shows that
ItM [Zt] = I
f
M [Zf ] = P (d) and that P (d) is assigned
19both truth values in M thus showing a conflict in M
itself which we know does not exist.
Thus there are no conflicts in M3 for the free and uni-
versal predicates too.
3. P is of arity ≥ 2 and is an existential predicate.
If It and If are of the same polarity in ϕ(x), then from
case (3b) of P1, we see that in M3, both ItM3 [Zt] and
IfM3 [Zf ] have the same truth value - True if their po-
larity is +ve and False if their polarity is −ve. Then
there is no conflict in the first place.
If It and If are of opposite polarity, then suppose that
they were in different clauses. From the last condition
of the EDP definition, there is a variable vl ∈ EU
such that It and If would be existentially distinguish-
able by it. Suppose it appears as the nth argument of
If . Then the nth argument of It would be either an
variable v ∈ Free or a variable vp ∈ EU or a variable
vr ∈ EU where r 6= l. Then Selector would assign
the nth argument of IfM3 [Zf ] as al ∈ Val(EU) while
the nth argument of ItM3 [Zt] would be respectively as-
signed a value either from (i) Val(Free) or from (ii)
Ac 6= ∅ for some colour c or (iii) ar ∈ Val(EU). The
values in case of (i) and (ii) must be different from al
since Val(EU) is disjoint with both Val(Free) and Ac.
In case of (iii), since r 6= l, ar 6= al. Thus in all cases,
the nth argument of IfM3 [Zf ] would be different from
that of ItM3 [Zt]. Then the conflict couldn’t have hap-
pened at all. A similar argument can be given for the
case when vl appears as the nth argument of It.
(We thus note how the last condition in the EDP def-
inition prevents the occurence of a conflict.)
Finally consider the case that It and If are of oppo-
site polarity and are in the same clause say C of ψ.
Then since M3 |= ItM3 [Zt] and M3 |= ¬I
f
M3
[Zf ], by
case (3b) of P1, we have that It is +ve while If is
−ve in ϕ(x). Then for the valuation Zf of the z vari-
ables,P1 would assign ItM3 [Zf ], the value True inM3.
Let C[Zf ] be the clause C as it appears in ψM3 [Zf ].
Then C[Zf ] which contains ItM3 [Zf ] and I
f
M3
[Zf ], is
not dependent on the literal corresponding to IfM3 [Zf ]
forC[Zf ] to become True inM3 as ItM3 [Zf ] is already
True in C[Zf ]. Then we cure the conflict on the value
of P (d) (= ItM3 [Zt] = I
f
M3
[Zf ]) by fixing the value of
P (d) in M3 to be True.
Now since M3 |= ϕ(a), we have that for every clause
C1 of ψ, C1[Z] is true in M3 for each valuation Z of
the z variables (C1[Z] is the clause C1 as it appears
in ψM3 [Z]). We note that while the fixing mentioned
above doesnt affect the truth of clause C[Zf ], we now
investigate whether this makes some other clause False
i.e. does there exist a valuation Z∗ of z and a clauseC∗
of ψ such that in ψM3 [Z∗], the clause C∗[Z∗] (which is
the clause C∗ as it appears in ψM3 [Z∗]) became False
due to the fixing. Suppose there is such a Z∗. Since
the fixing caused the change of truth value of C∗[Z∗]
from True to False, it must be the case that there is
an instance I∗ of P appearing in C∗[Z∗] such that
I∗M3 [Z
∗] = P (d) and such that I∗ is−ve in ψ. Further
I∗M3 [Z
∗] was earlier (i.e. before the fixing) assigned
value False (making its corresponding literal True) and
every other literal in C∗[Z∗] is assigned value False.
We firstly note that I∗ 6= It since they are of oppo-
site polarities. If C∗ 6= C, then It and I∗ are two
instances of P of opposite polarity appearing in differ-
ent clauses, which had earlier (i.e. before the fixing)
conflicted. But in the analysis shown above we know
that this cannot happen. Then C∗ = C. But then by
case (3b) of P1, ItM3 [Z∗] would be assigned True in
M3. But this contradicts the conclusion made above
that the literal corresponding to I∗M3 [Z
∗] was the only
literal in C∗[Z∗] that made the latter True.
Thus, by fixing the value of P (d) to True, the conflict
is eliminated and further for every clause C in ψ and
for every valuation Z of z, C[Z] continues to remain
True so that ϕ(a) continues to be True in the new M3
which is cured of one conflict.
Since M3 is of finite size, there are only a finite num-
ber of conflicts and the curing process above elimi-
nates conflicts one at a time while still preserving the
truth of ϕ(a) in the new M3 obtained after the curing.
Then this process terminates, giving a fully cured M3
which we call M ′2 such that M ′2 has no conflicts in it
at all (and hence is a valid Σ−structure) and such that
M ′2 |= ϕ(a). We thus note that M ′2 has been obtained
by simply resolving all the conflict cases in M3 and
retaining the truth values of all predicates for all their
arguments for which there is no conflict.
Completing the proof
With a last remaining argument now, we show that with this
M ′2, satisfies the last condition of the EBS definition.
For the proof to complete we need to show that M ′2|σ =
M2|σ (recall that M2 is the substructure of M generated
by UM2 ). Since σ can contain only nullary, unary, free and
existential predicates, we will consider each of these sepa-
rately.
1. Nullary predicates: From case (1) of Selector, all the
elements of C are interpreted in M3, and hence in M ′2,
with the same values as they are interpreted in M .
Thus M ′2|C =M2|C .
202. Free and universal predicates: For a free or universal
predicate P of arity≥ 2, using Lemma 11(2), P2, case
(3a) of P1 and the conclusion made above that there
are no conflicts on free and universal predicates, we
can conclude that M3|{P} = M2|{P}. Since in M ′2 is
obtained from M3 simply by fixing the conflict cases
and retaining the truth values of all predicates for all
their arguments for which there is no conflict, we con-
clude that M ′2|{P} =M3|{P} =M2|{P}.
3. Unary predicates: For P ∈ U, for the following cases
its is easy to see that M |= P (e) iff M3 |= P (e):
(i) P (e) is assigned the truth value by P2 (ii) P (e) =
IM3 [Z] for some valuation Z of the universal variables
and some instance I of P which is free or universal.
If P (e) = IM3 [Z] where I is existential, then for
e ∈ Val(Free), it is easy to see from Lemma 11(1)
and case (2) of P1, that M |= P (e) iff M3 |= P (e).
Else e = ac for some colour c. Then if IM [Z] =
P (d1), we have already seen above that d1 and ac
have the same colour c in M . Putting this together
with the fact from case (2) of P1 that M |= IM [Z] iff
M3 |= IM3 [Z], we have that P (e) has the same truth
value in M and M3. Thus in all cases M |= P (e)
iff M3 |= P (e). Since there are no conflicts on unary
predicates, M3|{P} = M2|{P}. Further since M ′2 is
obtained from M3 simply by fixing the conflict cases
and retaining the truth values of all predicates for all
their arguments for which there is no conflict, we con-
clude that M ′2|{P} =M3|{P} =M2|{P}.
We conclude from the above thatM ′2|σ =M2|σ and indeed,
that completes the proof!
8.2 Some observations about the EDP
class
We can see that both BSRΣ and LΣ without equal-
ity (i.e. just the Lo¨wenheim class) lie wholly within
EDPΣ(Σ). In case of ϕ ∈ BSRΣ, EV (ϕ) = ∅ and
hence it contains no existential predicates at all. Hence
all the conditions of the EDPΣ(Σ) definition are trivially
satisfied. In case of a sentence ϕ in LΣ without equality,
it contains no predicates of arity ≥ 2 and no equality
too. Hence all conditions of the EDPΣ(Σ) definition are
again trivially satisfied. Thus BSRΣ ⊆ EDPΣ(Σ) and
LΣ without equality ⊆ EDPΣ(Σ).
Let for sets A,B of sentences, A ⊑ B denote that A is
semantically contained inside B i.e. every sentence in A
is semantically equivalent to some sentence in B. We then
have the following.
Theorem 5 1. If σ1 ⊆ σ2 ⊆ Σ, then EDPΣ(σ2) ⊆
EDPΣ(σ1).
2. EDPΣ(σ) = EDPΣ(σ ∪ U).
3. Given σ1, σ2 ⊆ Σ, if σ1 \ σ2 contains
(a) Only unary predicates, then EDPΣ(σ2) ⊆
EDPΣ(σ1).
(b) A predicate of arity ≥ 2, then EDPΣ(σ2) 6⊑
EDPΣ(σ1).
Proof : Statements (1) and (2) above are easy to check and
statement (3)(a) follows from (1) and (2). For 3(b), let P
be the arity ≥ 2 predicate. Then consider the sentence φ as
seen in the proof of case 1 of Theorem 2(2) (in section 4.1).
φ = (
∧
Q∈Σ\{P} ∀zQQ(zQ)) ∧ (∀x∃yP (x, y, y, . . . , y))
In PCNF, one can check that φ ∈ EDPΣ(Σ \ {P}) and
hence φ ∈ EDPΣ(σ2). But as shown earlier, for any ψ
equivalent to φ, ψ /∈ EBSΣ(σ1) and hence by Corollary 4
(in section 8.1), ψ /∈ EDPΣ(σ1).
Analogous to EBSΣ, we define EDPΣ =
{EDPΣ(σ) | σ ⊆ Σ}. Then from Theorem 5(2),
EDPΣ = {EDPΣ(U ∪ σ) | σ ⊆ (Σ \ U)}. Then we have
the following.
Corollary 5 (EDPΣ,⊑) is a lattice which is isomorphic to
the powerset lattice (℘(Σ \ U),⊆).
Proof : From Theorem 5(3), we know that
EDPΣ(U ∪ σ1) 6= EDPΣ(U ∪ σ2) for σ1 6= σ2
where σ1, σ2 ⊆ (Σ \ U). Consider f : EBSΣ → ℘(Σ \ U)
such that f(EDPΣ(U ∪ σ)) = Σ \ σ. f can be seen to be
a bijection.
Now if f(EDPΣ(U ∪ σ1)) ⊆ f(EDPΣ(U ∪ σ2)), then
σ2 ⊆ σ1 and hence by parts (1) and (2) of Theorem
5, EDPΣ(U ∪ σ1) ⊆ EDPΣ(U ∪ σ2). Conversely if
EDPΣ(U ∪ σ1) ⊆ EDPΣ(U ∪ σ2), then since σ1 and
σ2 cannot contain any unary predicates, by Theorem
5(3), it must be that σ2 \ σ1 is empty. In other words,
f(EDPΣ(U ∪ σ1)) ⊆ f(EDPΣ(U ∪ σ2)). Thus f is an
isomorphism from EBSΣ to ℘(Σ \ U).
The lub(⊔) and glb(⊓) operators in (EDPΣ,⊆) are defined
as: EDPΣ(σ1) ⊔ EDPΣ(σ2) = EDPΣ(σ1 ∩ σ2) and
EDPΣ(σ1) ⊓ EDPΣ(σ2) = EDPΣ(σ1 ∪ σ2). Note
that EDPΣ(σ1 ∪ σ2) ⊆ (EDPΣ(σ1) ∩ EDPΣ(σ2)) and
(EDPΣ(σ1) ∪EDPΣ(σ2)) ⊆ EDPΣ(σ1 ∩ σ2).
Finally the following result shows that except under certain
conditions, EDPΣ(σ) is not a syntactic characterization of
EBSΣ(σ) in general. Below A ❁ B means A ⊑ B but
B 6⊑ A. Also ∼= means ‘semantic equivalence’ i.e. A ∼= B
iff A ⊑ B and B ⊑ A.
Theorem 6 1. If Σ contains only unary predicates,
EDPΣ(σ) ∼= EBSΣ(σ) ∼= BSRΣ for all σ ⊆ Σ.
212. If Σ contains a predicate of arity ≥ 2, then
(a) EDPΣ(Σ) ∼= EBSΣ(Σ) ∼= BSRΣ.
(b) If Σ \ σ contains atleast one unary predicate, then
EDPΣ(σ) ❁ EBSΣ(σ).
Proof: Part 1 above follows from Theorem 2(3) (of section
4.1) and Corollary 4 (of section 8.1). Part 2 follows from
Theorem 1 (of section 3) and Corollary 4. For part 2, let U
be the said unary predicate. Let P ∈ Σ be a predicate of
arity ≥ 2. Then consider the sentence φ used in the proof
of case (2) of Theorem 2(2). Now φ ∈ EBSΣ(σ). But
suppose it is equivalent to ψ ∈ EDPΣ(σ). By Theorem
5(2) and Corollary 4, ψ ∈ EBSΣ(σ ∪ U). But then from
the proof of case (2) of Theorem 2(2), ψ cannot be in any
EBSΣ(σ1) where σ1 contains U.
We do not know whether EBSΣ(σ) strictly semantically
subsumesEDPΣ(σ) whenΣ\σ does not contain any unary
predicate.
8.3 Extensions of the EDPΣ(σ) class
8.3.1 Relaxing the last condition of EDPΣ(σ)
Consider the last condition in the EDPΣ(σ) definition
disjuncted with the following condition:
For a predicate P of arity ≥ 2, for every pair of distinct
instances of P , atleast one of which is existential, either
(a) the two instances are existentially distinguishable
w.r.t. v ∈ EU or (b) the two instances are existentially
distinguishable w.r.t to every variable in E1,2 where E1,2
is the set of all the EU variables appearing as arguments in
the two instances. Then the bound in this case is given by
B = |V (ϕ)| + |EU|+ |EU| · 2k.
Proof:
We refer to the proof of Theorem 4 as given in section
8.1. We will need expand the initial substructure M1 by
making only the following changes. We choose Val(Free)
and Val(EU) as before. For any colour c, Ac however is
chosen as follows: Consider the set VcM as defined in the
proof. Let |EU| = p. If |VcM | < p, then choose Ac =
VcM (in this case we call Ac to be a ‘small partition’). Else
let acj1 , . . . , a
c
jp
be p distinct elements of VcM where EU =
{vj1 , . . . , vjp}. Then choose Ac = {acj1 , . . . , a
c
jp
} (in this
case we callAc as ‘a subset of a large partition’). As before,
letM1 be the substructure generated by Val(Free),Val(EU)
and
⋃
c∈{0,1}k A
c
. Then
|UM | ≤ |Val(Free)|+ |Val(EU)|+Σc∈{0,1}k |Ac|
≤ |V (ϕ)| + |EU|+ |EU| · 2
k
so that B = |V (ϕ)| + |EU|+ |EU| · 2k.
Let Z be an instantiation of the universal variables. We
modify Selector (which chooses the values to be assigned
to vi ∈ EU) as follows. Let d be the value from M chosen
for vi.
1. If d ∈ Val(Free), this same value is chosen in M3.
2. Else, let c be the colour of d in M . We have two suh-
cases here.
(a) If d is from a small partition, then d itself is chosen
as the value for vi
(b) Else aci is chosen as the value of vi.
Consider an instantiation Z of the universal variables. Sup-
pose P satisfies the condition above. Then for such a P , we
perform the assignment of truth values to the (instantiated)
instances of P in ψM3 [Z] as follows: for each instance I of
P in ψ, IM3 [Z] is assigned the same truth value in M3 as
IM [Z] is assigned in M (This kind of assignment is only
for P which satisfies the above condition. For existential
predicates R of arity ≥ 2 which satisfy condition (3) of the
‘basic’ EDP definition, the assignment is as given in the
proof of Theorem 4 of section 8.1).
All that we need to show now is that this assignment does
not produce any conflicts for P .
Suppose two instances conflicted. Let ItM3 [Zt] and I
f
M3
[Zf ]
be the conflicting instances. Then ItM3 [Zt] = I
f
M3
[Zf ] =
P (d) (say) and w.l.o.g. assume that M3 |= ItM3 [Zt] while
M3 |= ¬I
f
M3
[Zf ]. If It and If are free or universal in-
stances in ψ, then by Lemma 11 (appearing in the proof of
Theorem 4), ItM3 [Zt] = ItM [Zt] and I
f
M3
[Zf ] = IfM [Zf ].
Further by our assignment of truth values above, M3 |=
IαM3 [Zα] iff M |= I
α
M [Zα] for α ∈ {t, f}. Then this would
produce a conflict in M itself which we know is absent.
If atleast one of It or If is existential, then we have the
following cases:
1. It and If are existentially distinguishable w.r.t. v ∈
EU. Then in this case a conflict cannot occur by a sim-
ilar reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4.
2. For each v ∈ EU, the ith argument of It is v iff the
ith argument of If is v (i.e. no v existentially distin-
guishes It and If ). Then as per the new condition, It
and If are existentially distinguishable w.r.t. all vari-
ables in Et,f where Et,f is the set of all EU variables
that appear as arguments in It and If .
Suppose all the EU variables in ItM3 [Zt] and I
f
M3
[Zf ]
take values from a small partition. Then from case (2)
of Selector above, each EU variable in It takes on the
same value in ItM3 [Zt] as in I
t
M [Zt]. Likewise for If .
If the ith argument of It is v ∈ EU, then so is the ith
argument of If . Putting together these observations
with the fact that ItM3 [Zt] = I
f
M3
[Zf ], we can infer
22that ItM [Zt] = I
f
M [Zf ]. But since the truth values are
preserved for corresponding instances in ψM [Z] and
ψM3 [Z], we conclude that there must be a conflict in
M itself which we know is absent.
The case remaining is that there is some EU variable
vi in Et,f that takes on a value from a subset of a large
domain i.e. vi is assigned a value of the form aci . Sup-
pose vi appears as the gth argument of It. Then the
gth argument of ItM3 [Zt] is a
c
i . Now since It and If
are existentially distinguishable w.r.t. vi, the gth argu-
ment of If is either (a) x ∈ Free or (b) v ∈ EU or
(c) vj ∈ EU where j 6= i. Then the gth argument of
IfM3 [Zf ] is either (a) a value from Val(Free) or (b) a
value from Val(EU) or (c) a value from a small parti-
tion or a value of the form acj (which is not equal to aci
as j 6= i. In each of these cases, we can see that the
gth argument of IfM3 [Zf ] cannot be a
c
i . Then ItM3 [Zt]
and IfM3 [Zf ] do not conflict in the first place.
Thus in each case we have shown that conflicts are not pos-
sible at all.
Note that since the colour of the value assigned to vi in
ψM [Z] and ψM3 [Z] is the same, the argument given for the
unary predicates in the ‘Completing the proof’ section of
the proof of Theorem 4 would still hold.
8.3.2 Relaxing the equalities
1. If equalities are also allowed between free and EU
variables (in addition to the ones given in the EDP
definition), then the bound remains the same as the one
given in Theorem 4).
Proof:
We use the same construction as given in the proof of
Theorem 4 in section 8.1 and show below that it also
handles the case of equalities mentioned above. Consider
the case when equalities are also allowed between free and
EU variables. Suppose the equality x = vi occurs in some
clause where x ∈ Free and vi ∈ EU. Now according to
our choice of the values for variable vi ∈ EU given an
instantiation Z of the universal variables, if in the model
M , it took on the value in Val(Free), then in the model M3,
we choose the same value for it. Thus the equality x = vi
evaluates to the same truth value in M3 as it does in M .
If vi took on a value d /∈ Val(Free), then x = vi would
evaluate to False in M . In M3, vi would be assigned the
value ac where c is the colour of d in M . Since ac ∈ Ac
and Ac ∩ Val(Free) = ∅, ac /∈ Val(Free) and hence x = vi
would evaluate to False in M3 as well. Thus in either case,
we find that the equality x = vi evaluates to the same truth
value in M3 as it does in M . Thus the choice of vi as done
by Selector handles the case of equalities between free and
EU variables as well.
2. If equalities are also allowed between two EU variables
(in addition to the above equalities), then the bound is given
by B = |V (ϕ)| + |EU|+ |EU| · 2k.
Proof:
Consider the case when equalities are allowed between two
EU variables. We will need expand the initial substruc-
ture M1 as constructed in the proof of Theorem 4, by
making only the following changes. We choose Val(Free)
and Val(EU) as before. For any colour c, Ac however
is chosen as follows: Consider the set VcM as defined
earlier. Let |EU| = p. If |VcM | < p, then choose
Ac = VcM . Else let acj1 , . . . , a
c
jp
be p distinct elements
of VcM where EU = {vj1 , . . . , vjp}. Then choose Ac =
{acj1 , . . . , a
c
jp
}. As before, let M1 be the substructure gen-
erated by Val(Free),Val(EU) and
⋃
c∈{0,1}k A
c
. Then
|UM | ≤ |Val(Free)|+ |Val(EU)|+Σc∈{0,1}k |Ac|
≤ |V (ϕ)|+ |EU|+ |EU| · 2
k
so that B = |V (ϕ)| + |EU|+ |EU| · 2k.
Let Z be an instantiation of the universal variables. We
modify Selector (which chooses the values to be assigned
to vi ∈ EU) as follows. Let d be the value from M chosen
for vi.
1. If d ∈ Val(Free), this same value is chosen in M3.
2. Else, let c be the colour of d in M . We have two suh-
cases here.
(a) If vi is assigned a value which is different from the
values assigned to the other vj’s where vj ∈ EU, then
choose aci for vi in M3.
(b) Let V be the set of all those vj ’s which have been
assigned the same value as vi. Then let i∗ be the least
index appearing as subscript of some variable in V .
Then choose aci∗ for vi in M3.
We will now show that by the choices made as above, the
new kinds of equalities in ψM3 [Z] will also evaluate to the
same truth value in M3 as the corresponding equalities in
ψM [Z] evaluate to in M .
Suppose the equality x = vi occurs in some clause where
x ∈ Free and vi ∈ EU. Now according to our choice of
the values for variable vi ∈ EU given an instantiation Z of
the universal variables, if in ψM [Z], it took on the value
in Val(Free), then in the ψM3 [Z] also the same value is
chosen for it. Thus the equality x = vi evaluates to the
same truth value in M3 as it does in M . If vi took on a
value d /∈ Val(Free), then x = vi would evaluate to False
23in M . In M3, vi would be assigned a value in Ac which is
disjoint with Val(Free). Hence x = vi would evaluate to
False in M3 as well. Thus in either case, we find that the
equality x = vi evaluates to the same truth value in M3 as
it does in M .
Suppose the equality vi = vj occurs in some clause where
vi, vj ∈ EU. Suppose in ψM [Z], vi and vj are assigned the
same value. Then from case 2(b) of the modified Selector
above, we know that in ψM3 [Z] too, vi and vj would
be assigned the same value. If vi and vj were assigned
different values in ψM [Z], then they would be assigned
different values in ψM3 [Z] as well. If not then say ack is
the common value assigned to both in ψM3 [Z]. Then from
case 2(b) of Selector, it must have been the case that vi was
assigned the same value as vk (where vk is the least indexed
variable in the set of all the EU variables whose values in
ψM [Z] were the same as vi) and also vj was assigned the
same value as vk in ψM [Z]. Then vi and vj were assigned
the same value which contradicts the assumption made
above. Thus in either case vi = vj evaluates to the same
truth value in M3 as it does in M .
Note that since the colour of the value assigned to vi in
ψM [Z] and ψM3 [Z] is the same, the argument given for the
unary predicates in the ‘Completing the proof’ section of
the proof of Theorem 4 would still hold.
Conjecture:
Generalising EDP with the conditions 1 and 2(b) above
together, the bound is given by
B = |V (ϕ)| + |EU|+ |EU| · 2k
8.3.3 Extension to an order-sorted logic
There has been recent work ([8]) on extending BSR to
order-sorted logics. EDPΣ(σ) being an unsorted logic
which is orthogonal to the extension presented in [8], these
two extensions can be combined to yield syntactic gener-
alizations of BSR which subsume each of the individual
extensions.
8.4 The Lo¨wenheim class with equality
For the Lo¨wenheim class with equality, the bound B in
general is q.2k (where q is the length of the quantifier
prefix) [2]. But this class, being a special case of the
EDPΣ(Σ) class, from the above results, we get the fol-
lowing finer bounds for the Lo¨wenheim class with equality
for different cases of equality.
1. For the Lo¨wenheim class extended with equality,
where the equalities are either between (a) two free
variables or (b) two universal variables or (c) a free
and a universal variable or (d) a free and an EU vari-
able, the bound (on the size of the sub-model) is given
by B = |V (ϕ)| + 2k.
2. For the Lo¨wenheim class extended with equality, if in
addition to the above kind of equalities, equalities be-
tween EU variables are also allowed, then the bound is
given by B = |V (ϕ)| + |EU| · 2k.
8.5 Complexity of the SAT problem for
EDP
The bounded model property of EDPΣ(σ) allows us to
also characterize the complexity of its SAT problem.
Theorem 7 The satisfiability problem for EDPΣ(σ) is
NEXPTIME-complete.
Proof: Indeed EDPΣ(σ) satisfies the two conditions of
Corollary 2 (appearing towards the end of section 5.3): (a)
The bound B for a sentence φ ∈ EDPΣ(σ) is ≤ 2O(|φ|).
Then f(φ), as defined in Lemma 8 (of section 5.3), is
efficiently (polynomial time) computable and such that
f(φ) ≤ 2O(|φ|). (b) EDPΣ(σ) contains BSRΣ (since
BSRΣ ⊆ EDPΣ(Σ) ⊆ EDPΣ(σ)).
An interesting consequence of the above result is that since
the satisfiability checking problem for both BSRΣ and
EDPΣ(σ) is NEXPTIME-complete for all σ ⊆ Σ, it
means that there is an efficient reduction from EDPΣ(∅)
to BSRΣ which yields a BSRΣ sentence which is equisat-
isfiable with a given EDPΣ(∅) sentence. There is some re-
cent work ( [3]) on improved heuristics in deciding BSRΣ
sentences. Finding an efficient reduction from EDPΣ(∅)
to BSRΣ would therefore help us get better heuristics to
decide EDPΣ(∅) sentences as well. We present one such
reduction in Section 10.
9 Closure Properties of EBSΣ and EDPΣ
For Σ which contains only unary predicates, EBSΣ(σ) =
EDPΣ(σ) = FOΣ. Clearly then EBSΣ(σ) = EDPΣ(σ)
are closed under ∧,∨ and ¬.
Hence below we consider Σ to have atleast one arity ≥ 2
predicate.
9.1 Closure properties of EBSΣ
Consider ϕi ∈ EBSΣ(σi). Let B1,B2 be the bounds for
ϕ1, ϕ2 respectively.
241) ∧−closure
Let ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2. Assume σ1 = σ2 = Σ.
Suppose M |= ϕ. Then M |= ϕi. Then there exists a
substructure Mi,1 of M such that |UMi,1 | ≤ Bi which
satisfies the EBSΣ(Σ) conditions for ϕi. Then let M1
be the substructure of M generated by UM1,1 ∪ UM2,1 .
Consider any extension M2 of M1 within M . Since M2
extends Mi,1, M2 |= ϕi (this is because ϕi ∈ EBSΣ(σi)).
Then M2 |= ϕ. Thus ϕ ∈ EBSΣ(Σ). The bound B of ϕ is
not more than |UM1 | which is ≤ B1 + B2.
However suppose w.l.o.g, σ1 is not Σ. Then while con-
sidering any common extension M2 of M1,1 and M2,1
(mentioned above), to satisfy ϕ1, in general, we might have
to interpret the Σ \ σ1 predicates in a way which might
conflict with the way these predicates are interpreted in
trying to satisfy ϕ2.
2) ∨−closure
Let ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2.
Suppose M |= ϕ. Then suppose M |= ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2.
Then consider M1 as M1,1 mentioned above. Then any
extension M2 of M1 within M satisfies ϕ1 and hence ϕ.
If M |= ϕ2 ∧ ¬ϕ1 then consider M1 as M2,1 mentioned
above. Then any extension M2 of M1 within M satisfies
ϕ2 and hence ϕ. Thus in either case M1 is such that
|UM1 | ≤ max{B1,B2}. Further, the interpretations of the
σ1 ∩ σ2 are guaranteed to be preserved when extending
M1,1 or M2,1. Hence ϕ ∈ EBSΣ(σ1 ∩ σ2). The bound for
ϕ is B = |UM1 | ≤ max{B1,B2}.
3) ¬−(non)closure
Consider the following sentence in the vocabulary Σ =
{E} where E is a 2-ary predicate (If Σ contains a higher
arity predicate, then that can simulate a 2-ary predicate and
hence we can construct an example in that case too similar
to the one shown below).
Φ = ∀x¬E(x, x) ∧ ∀x∃y ((x 6= y) ∧E(x, y))∧
∀x∀y∀z(E(x, y) ∧ E(y, z)→ E(x, z))
= ∀x∀y∀z∃w
(¬E(x, x) ∧ (E(x, y) ∧ E(y, z)→ E(x, z))∧
(x 6= w) ∧ E(x,w))
We can see that the models of this sentence are infinite
DAGs. Then Φ /∈ EBSΣ(∅). Now Φ is a ∀∗∃∗ sen-
tence and its negation is an ∃∗∀∗ sentence which belongs
to BSRΣ ⊆ EBSΣ(Σ).
9.2 Closure properties of EDPΣ
Consider ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 where ϕi ∈ EDPΣ(σi).
1) ∧−closure
Let ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2.
Let σ∗i be the set of all unary, free and universal predicates
appearing in ϕi. Assume σ∗1 = σ∗2 = Σ. Then there are no
existential predicates in both ϕ1 and ϕ2. Then in ϕ, firstly
rename the variables of ϕ2 so that they are completely
disjoint with those of ϕ1 and bring ϕ in PCNF with the
leftmost ∃ quantifiers of ϕ being leftmost ∃ quantifiers
of ϕ1 and ϕ2 and the matrix of ϕ being the matrices of
ϕ1 and ϕ2 conjuncted. Then V (ϕ) = V (ϕ1) ∪ V (ϕ2).
The predicates which were free or universal in ϕ1 or ϕ2
continue to remain so in ϕ since the free or universal nature
of each instance of ϕ1 or ϕ2 remains unaffected upon the
conjunction since we made the variables of ϕ1 and ϕ2
disjoint. Thus F = F1 ∪ F2 and A = A1 ∪ A2. Also
clearly U = U1 ∪ U2 i.e. the unary predicates U of ϕ are
those that appear in ϕ1 (i.e. U1) or those that appear in ϕ2
(i.e. U2). Then Σ = σ∗1 = σ∗2 = σ∗1 ∪σ∗2 = U∪F ∪A ⊆ Σ.
Since equality ∈ Fi ∪ Ai, we have that in ϕ, equality
∈ F ∪ A. Since there are no existential predicates in ϕi,
there are none in ϕ as well. Thus ϕ ∈ EDPΣ(Σ).
However suppose w.l.o.g σ∗1 6= Σ. Then consider the fol-
lowing sentences: ϕ1 = ∀x∃yP (x, y) , ϕ2 = ∀x¬P (x, x).
Then bringing ϕ into PCNF as explained above, we have
ϕ = ∀z∀x∃y(P (x, y)∧¬P (z, z)). These two instances are
not existentially distinguishable w.r.t. y - the only variable
in EU. Then ϕ /∈ EDPΣ(σ) for any σ ⊆ Σ. (One can
construct a similar example for any other Σ which contains
atleast one arity ≥ 2 predicate.)
2) ∨−closure
Let ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2.
Assume σ∗1 = σ∗2 = Σ. Then again there are no existential
variables at all. Then by the same argument as above, it is
easy to see that ϕ ∈ EDPΣ(Σ).
However suppose w.l.o.g σ∗1 6= Σ. Then consider the
following sentences:
ϕ1 = ∀x∃y(P (x, y) ∧ P (x, x)) ; ϕ2 = ∀x¬P (x, x).
Then bringing ϕ into PCNF as explained above, we have
ϕ = ∀z∀x∃y(P (x, y)∨¬P (z, z))∧ (P (x, x)∧¬P (z, z)).
Now P (x, y) and ¬P (z, z) appearing in the first and
second clauses respectively differ in polarity. But these two
instances are not existentially distinguishable w.r.t. y - the
only variable in EU. Then ϕ /∈ EDPΣ(σ) for any σ ⊆ Σ.
(One can construct a similar example for any other Σ which
contains atleast one arity ≥ 2 predicate.)
3) ¬−(non)closure
25Consider ϕ = ∃x∀y(P (x, y) ∨ ¬P (y, y)). Now ϕ ∈
EDPΣ(Σ). But in ¬ϕ = ∀x∃y(¬P (x, y)) ∧ (P (y, y)),
the two instances are not existentially distinguishable w.r.t.
y - the only variable in EU. Then ϕ /∈ EDPΣ(σ) for any
σ ⊆ Σ. (One can construct a similar example for any other
Σ which contains atleast one arity ≥ 2 predicate.)
10 Spectral Properties of EDPΣ(∅) and Ap-
plications
Consider an EDPΣ(∅) sentence
ϕ = ∀z0∃v1∀z1∃v2∀z2 . . . ∃vr∀zrξ(z, v1 . . . , vr)
where z = (z0, . . . , zr) and ξ is quantifier-free. Let B be
the bound for ϕ as given by Theorem 4 (of section 8.1),
and let X = {x1, x2, . . . xB} be a set of B fresh variables.
In addition, let ψ be the BSRΣ formula defined as follows.
ψ = ∃x1 . . . ∃xB∀z0∀z1 . . . ∀zr (χ) where
χ = (
∨
u1∈X
. . .
∨
ur∈X
ξ(z, v1 7→ u1, . . . , vr 7→ ur))
where ξ(z, v1 7→ u1, . . . , vr 7→ ur) is the formula obtained
by replacing every occurence of vi in ξ by ui.
Theorem 8 The spectrum of ϕ equals the spectrum of ψ.
Proof Sketch: It is straightforward to see that every model
of ψ is also a model of ϕ. Therefore, the spectrum of ψ is
contained in that of ϕ.
For the other way round, consider a model M of ϕ. The
technique used in the proof of Theorem 4 of section 8.1
can now be used to construct a model M ′ of ϕ such
that UM = UM ′ and M |σ= M ′ |σ . Furthermore, the
construction guarantees that when ϕ is evaluated on M ′,
all existentially quantified variables can take values from
a fixed subset V ⊂ UM ′ such that |V | ≤ B, and yet cause
ϕ to evaluate to True. This special property of M ′ ensures
that M ′ |= ψ as well. Since UM = UM ′ , this proves
that the spectrum of ϕ is contained in the spectrum of ψ.
Hence, ϕ and ψ have the same spectrum. Note that ψ is not
semantically equivalent to ϕ. It is certainly equisatisfiable
to ϕ, but is also “equispectral” to ϕ.
An immediate application of Theorem 8 in SMT solving
stems from recent results due to Fontaine [4]. In [4], a no-
tion of gentle theories is introduced and it is argued that
BSR, Lo¨wenheim and FO2 (FO with two variables) the-
ories are gentle. Intuitively, a gentle theory is one in which
one can completely express the spectrum. Fontaine further
shows that gentle theories can be combined with almost any
other decidable theories in an SMT solving setting with co-
operating decision procedures for multiple theories. From
Theorem 8, we know that for every ϕ ∈ EDPΣ(∅), we can
effectively construct a BSR formula ψ that has the same
spectrum as ϕ. Since BSR has been shown to be a gen-
tle theory in [4], this implies that EDPΣ(∅) is gentle as
well, and can be combined with other decidable theories for
SMT solving. From Theorem 5 (in section 8.2) and the fact
that EDPΣ(Σ) contains BSRΣ, we know that EDPΣ(∅)
semantically generalizes BSRΣ. Hence, EDPΣ(∅) is a
semantically richer theory than BSRΣ that is still gentle.
Interestingly, Fontaine gives separate proofs of gentleness
of the BSR class and of the Lo¨wenheim class with equal-
ity [4]. Since Lo¨weheim class with equality is contained in
EBSΣ(Σ) with the bound B = q.2k (q = number of quan-
tifiers, and k = number of distinct monadic predicates),
Theorem 1 (of section 3) and its proof allow us to effec-
tively construct a BSR formula that is semantically equiv-
alent to a Lo¨wenheim formula with equality. Hence a gen-
tleness proof of BSR suffices to prove that the Lo¨wenheim
class with equality is also gentle. Section 8.4 also describes
how EDPΣ(Σ) (and hence EDPΣ(∅)) contains and in-
deed generalizes the Lo¨wenheim class with equality. We,
therefore, believe that EDPΣ(∅) and its variants truly ex-
pand the set of gentle theories, and permit SMT solving
with cooperating decision procedures on richer problems.
Note that satisfiability checking for formulas in EDPΣ(∅)
can be reduced to the satisfiability checking problem of the
equispectral BSRΣ formula. Model-finding of EDPΣ(∅)
formulas can be done in the same way as is done for BSRΣ
formulas [1].
Yet other interesting applications of the EDPΣ(∅) class
arise in bounded model checking and inductive property
checking. Consider a (possibly infinite) state transition sys-
tem whose transition relation is given by a first order logic
formula T (s, s′) on current and next state variables s and s′
respectively. Let I(s) and P (s) be predicates on state vari-
ables denoting the initial set of states and the set of states
with property P . In the classical bounded model checking
problem, we wish to find if there exists a run of the sys-
tem for k steps, starting from an initial state and ending in
a state satisfying P . This can be posed as the satisfiability
checking problem of the sentence:
ϕbmc = ∃s0 . . .∃sk I(s0)∧T (s0, s1)∧. . . T (sk−1, sk)∧P (sk)
Similarly, in inductive property checking, we wish to find if
there exists a run of the system for k steps, starting from a
state satisfying P such that P is violated for the first time in
the kth step. This is equivalent to checking the satisfiability
of the sentence:
ϕind = ∃s0 . . . ∃sk P (s0) ∧ T (s0, s1) ∧ P (s1) . . . ∧
P (sk−1) ∧ T (sk−1, sk) ∧ ¬P (sk)
It can be shown that if I(s), T (s, s′), P (s) and ¬P (s) are
in EDPΣ(∅), then one can obtain the size of a bounded
model for both ϕbmc and ϕind from the bounds B for I(s),
26T (s, s′), P (s) and ¬P (s). The “extensible” bounded sub-
model property of EDPΣ(∅) formulae ensures that the
bound of the model size for ϕbmc and ϕind grows slowly
(linearly) with k. The reader is referred to [9] for further
details.
11 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a semantic and syntactic gener-
alization of the widely used BSR class of first order logic
sentences. Our study showed a lattice-structured general-
ization both in the semantic and syntactic domains with
strict inclusions between classes of formulae. The semantic
generalization subsumes all FOΣ formulae with finite and
co-finite spectra in the limit. We also showed that several
well known decidable classes of FOΣ sentences are sub-
sumed by our generalization. This gives rise to alternative
proofs of some interesting results. The syntactic general-
ization enjoys special spectral properties, that can be ef-
fectively used in applications like SMT solving, bounded
model checking and inductive property checking. There
are several open questions that still remain. Most important
among them is the question of whether a syntactic charac-
terization of EBSΣ(∅) is possible in the same sense that
BSRΣ syntactically characterizes EBSΣ(Σ). Identifying
other useful fragments for which membership is decidable,
and the bound B is efficiently computable presents yet an-
other major challenge for future work.
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